Rewording so that equations do not exceed line widths

This commit is contained in:
Jeff Burdges 2016-11-07 18:14:37 +01:00
parent d46fa6c6ef
commit 2887caf652

View File

@ -496,10 +496,10 @@ exposes these events as anchors for tax audits on income.
A \emph{coin} in Taler is a public-private key pair where the private A \emph{coin} in Taler is a public-private key pair where the private
key is only known to the owner of the coin. A coin derives its key is only known to the owner of the coin. A coin derives its
financial value from an RSA signature over the FDH financial value from an RSA signature over the full doman hash (FDH)
of the coin's public key. The exchange has multiple RSA {\em of the coin's public key. The exchange has multiple RSA
denomination key} pairs available for blind-signing coins of {\em denomination key} pairs available for blind-signing coins of
different value. different values.
Denomination keys have an expiration date, before which any coins Denomination keys have an expiration date, before which any coins
signed with it must be spent or refreshed. This allows the exchange signed with it must be spent or refreshed. This allows the exchange
@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ Now the customer carries out the following interaction with the exchange:
The exchange receives the transaction and credits the reserve $W_p$ The exchange receives the transaction and credits the reserve $W_p$
with the respective amount in its database. with the respective amount in its database.
\item[POST {\tt /withdraw/sign}] \item[POST {\tt /withdraw/sign}]
The customer sends $S_W(B)$ where $B := B_b(\FDH_K(C_p))$ to The customer computes $B := B_b(\FDH_K(C_p))$ and sends $S_W(B)$ to
the exchange to request withdrawal of $C$; here, $B_b$ denotes the exchange to request withdrawal of $C$; here, $B_b$ denotes
Chaum-style blinding with blinding factor $b$. Chaum-style blinding with blinding factor $b$.
\item[200 OK / 403 FORBIDDEN] \item[200 OK / 403 FORBIDDEN]
@ -698,8 +698,8 @@ Now the customer carries out the following interaction with the exchange:
error back to the customer, with proof that it operated correctly. error back to the customer, with proof that it operated correctly.
Assuming the signature was valid, this would involve showing the transaction Assuming the signature was valid, this would involve showing the transaction
history for the reserve. history for the reserve.
\item[Done] The customer computes and verifies the unblinded signature \item[Done] The customer computes the unblinded signature $U_b(S_K(B))$ and
$S_K(\FDH_K(C_p)) = U_b(S_K(B))$. verifies that $S_K(\FDH_K(C_p)) = U_b(S_K(B))$.
Finally the customer saves the coin $\langle S_K(\FDH_K(C_p)), c_s \rangle$ Finally the customer saves the coin $\langle S_K(\FDH_K(C_p)), c_s \rangle$
to their local wallet on disk. to their local wallet on disk.
\end{description} \end{description}
@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ with signature $\widetilde{C} := S_K(\FDH_K(C_p))$
exchanges accepted by the merchant where each $X_j$ is a exchange's exchanges accepted by the merchant where each $X_j$ is a exchange's
public key. public key.
\item[Proposal] \item[Proposal]
The merchant creates a digitally signed contract The merchant creates a signed contract
$\mathcal{A} := S_M(m, f, a, H(p, r), \vec{X})$ $\mathcal{A} := S_M(m, f, a, H(p, r), \vec{X})$
where $m$ is an identifier for this transaction, $f$ is the price of the offer, where $m$ is an identifier for this transaction, $f$ is the price of the offer,
and $a$ is data relevant and $a$ is data relevant