542 lines
26 KiB
TeX
542 lines
26 KiB
TeX
\chapter{Introduction}\label{chapter:introduction}
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New networking and cryptographic protocols can substantially improve
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electronic online payment systems. This book is about the design,
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implementation and security analysis of GNU
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Taler\footnote{\url{https://taler.net/}}, a privacy-friendly payment
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system that is designed to be practical for usage as an online
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(micro-)payment method, and at the same time socially and ethically
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responsible.
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Payment systems can generally be divided into two types: Register-based
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and value-based~\cite{riksbank2017riksbank}. A register-based system
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associates value with identities (e.g., bank account balances with
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customers), while a value-based system associates value with typically
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anonymous, digital or physical tokens (such as cash or prepaid credit
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cards). In practice, these two types of systems are combined, as
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different layers have different (and often conflicting) requirements:
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the payment system used to pay for a cappuccino in a coffee shop is
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most likely not suitable to buy real estate. Value-based payment
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systems typically provide more anonymity and convenience but also more
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risk to consumers (as they are responsible to secure the values they
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hold), while register-based systems shift risks to the payment service
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provider who has to authenticate consumers and ensure the integrity of
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the register.
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This book explains GNU Taler, a design and implementation of a value-based
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payment system, discussing in-depth how to create a practical,
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privacy-preserving and secure (micro-)payment protocol that integrates nicely
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with the modern web. Our value-based payment protocol can in principle
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operate on top of any existing register-based system.
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GNU Taler is an official package of the GNU
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project\footnote{\url{https://gnu.org/}}. Our free software implementation is
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freely available from the GNU mirrors.
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\section{Design Goals for GNU Taler}
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The design of payment systems shapes economies and societies
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\cite{zandi2013impact,dalebrant2016monetary}. Payment systems with high
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transaction costs create an economic burden. Predominantly cash-based
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societies provide some degree of anonymity for their citizens, but can fail to
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provide a sound foundation for taxation, facilitate corruption
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\cite{singh2017does} and thus risk creating weak governments. On the other
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hand, systems with too much surveillance eliminate personal freedom.
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As the Internet has no standardized payment system, especially not one
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that is capable of quickly, efficiently and securely settling small
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transactions (so-called micropayments), the majority of content on the web is
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financed by advertisements. As a result, advertising (and by
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implication, collecting data on users) has been a dominant business
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model on the Internet. This has not only resulted in a loss of
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independence of publishers---who need to cater to the needs
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of advertisers---but also in a situation where micro-targeted ads
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are so wide-spread, that they have been suspected to have influenced
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multiple major elections~\cite{persily2017election}. Ads are also a
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vector for malware \cite{provos2007ghost}. Due to the prevalence of
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ad blockers, ads are also not guaranteed to be a sustainable business
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model.
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In the world of online payments, credit cards and a sprawling number
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of smaller, proprietary payment processors are currently dominant, and
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market shares vary widely between different
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countries~\cite{adyen2016global,paypers2016ecommerce}. The resulting
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fragmentation again increases social costs: online shops can either
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choose to invest in implementing many proprietary protocols, or only
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implement the most popular ones, thereby reinforcing the dominance of
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a handful of proprietary payment systems.
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Considering these and other social implications of payment systems, we
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started the development of GNU Taler with a set of high-level design
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goals that fit our social agenda. They are ranked by the importance
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we give to them, and when a trade-off must be made, the one that
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supports the more highly ranked goal is preferred:
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% what about micropayments -> part of 'efficient'
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\begin{enumerate}
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must be implemented as free software.}
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Free refers to ``free as in free speech'', as opposed to ``free as in free beer''.
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More specifically, the four essential freedoms of free software
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\cite{stallman2002essays} must be respected, namely users must have the
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freedom to (1) run the software, (2) study and modify it, (3) redistribute
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copies, and (4) distribute copies of the modified version.
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For merchants this prevents vendor lock-in, as another payment provider can
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take over, should the current one provide inadequate quality of service.
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As the software of
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the payment provider itself is free, smaller or disadvantaged countries or
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organizations can run the payment system without being controlled by a
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foreign company. Customers benefit from this freedom, as the wallet
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software can be made to run on a variety of platforms, and user-hostile
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features such as tracking or telemetry could easily be removed from
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wallet software.
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This rules out the mandatory usage of specialized
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hardware such as smart cards or other hardware security modules, as the
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software they run cannot be modified by the user. These components can,
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however, be voluntarily used by merchants, customers or payment processors
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to increase their operational security.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must protect the privacy of buyers.}\label{item:privacy}
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Privacy should be guaranteed via technical measures, as opposed to mere
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policies. Especially with micropayments for online content, a
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disproportionate amount of rather private data about buyers would be revealed, if
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the payment system does not have privacy protections.
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%Especially if a payment system is to be used for microtransactions for online
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%content, the privacy of buyers becomes important: if micropayments were more
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%commonplace, the transaction data could be used to collect extremely detailed
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%profiles of users. Unfortunately practically no commercially used payment
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%system has strong anonymity guarantees.
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In legislations with data protection regulations (such as the recently introduced GDPR in Europe \cite{voigt2017eu}),
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merchants benefit from this as well, as no data breach of customers can happen if this information
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is, by design, not collected in the first place. Obviously some private data, such as the shipping
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address for a physical delivery, must still be collected according to business needs.
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The security of the payment systems also benefits from this, as the model
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shifts from authentication of customers to mere authorization of payments.
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This approach rules out whole classes of attacks such as phishing \cite{garera2007framework} or credit
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card fraud \cite{sahin2010overview}.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must enable the state to tax income and crack down on
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illegal business activities.}
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% FIXME: provide broader ethical justification!
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As a payment system must still be legal to operate and use, it must comply
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with these requirements. Furthermore, we consider levying of taxes as
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beneficial to society.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must prevent payment fraud.}
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This imposes requirements on the security of the system, as well as on the
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general design, as payment fraud can also happen through misleading user
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interface design or the lack of cryptographic evidence for certain
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processes.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must only disclose the minimal amount of information
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necessary.}
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The reason behind this goal is similar to (\ref{item:privacy}). The
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privacy of buyers is given priority, but other parties such as merchants
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still benefit from it, for example, by keeping details about the merchant's financials
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hidden from competitors.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must be usable.}
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Specifically it must be usable for non-expert customers. Usability also
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applies to the integration with merchants, and informs choices about the
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architecture, such as encapsulating procedures that require cryptographic
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operations into an isolated component with a simple API.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must be efficient.}
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% FIXME: provide broader ethical justification (environmental impact,
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% social cost, opportunity cost of lack of micropayments)
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Approaches such as proof-of-work are ruled out by this requirement. Efficiency is
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necessary for GNU Taler to be used for micropayments.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must avoid single points of failure.}
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While the design we present later is rather centralized, avoiding single
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points of failure is still a goal. This manifests in architectural choices such as
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the isolation of certain components, and auditing procedures.
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\item \textbf{GNU Taler must foster competition.}
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It must be relatively easy for competitors to join the systems. While the
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barriers for this in traditional financial systems are rather high, the
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technical burden for new competitors to join must be minimized. Another
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design choice that supports this is to split the whole system into smaller
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components that can be operated, developed and improved upon independently,
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instead of having one completely monolithic system.
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\end{enumerate}
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\section{Features of Value-based Payment Systems}\label{sec:intro:features}
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There are many different possible features that have been proposed for
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value-based (sometimes called token-based) payment systems in the past. While we
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will discuss existing work on e-cash in more detail in
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Section~\ref{sec:related-work:e-cash}, we will begin by a brief
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summary of the possible features that value-based payment systems
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could provide, and clarify which high-level features we chose to adopt
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for GNU Taler.
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% EXPLAIN: in traditional (online) e-cash, spending is never
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% bound to a contract identifier
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%\subsubsection*{Different signature schemes and zero-knowledge proofs}
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%Since Chaum's original blind signature scheme based on RSA, many variations
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%using other cryptographic primitives have been developed. Some newer e-cash
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%schemes do not use blind signatures, but rely on zero-knowledge proofs instead.
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%
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%In GNU Taler, we opt for an RSA-based blind signature scheme, due to the low
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%complexity, relatively clear security assumptions and small number of
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%communication rounds compared to other protocols.
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\subsection{Offline vs Online Payments}
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Anonymous digital cash schemes since Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} were frequently designed to allow
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the merchant to be offline during the transaction, by providing a means to
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deanonymize customers involved in double-spending, typically by encoding the
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customer's identity into their coins in a way that makes it only possible to
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decode the identity with two spending transcripts.
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This approach is problematic in practice, as customers that restore a wallet
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from backup might accidentally double-spend and would then face punishment for
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it. Enforcing punishment for double-spenders can be rather difficult as well,
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since the double-spender might have signed up with a false identity or might
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already have fled to another country, and a large number of merchants might already
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have been defrauded with the same coins.
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Should the issuer of e-cash be compromised, an attacker could issue coins that
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fail to identify a culprit or even blame somebody else when they are
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double-spent. In an offline e-cash system, the detection of such an event is
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greatly delayed compared to systems with online spending, which can immediately
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detect when more coins are spent than were issued.
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Thus, in GNU Taler, we decided that all coins must be immediately
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deposited online during a purchase. Only either a merchant or a customer
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needs to be online, since one of the two can forward messages to the
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payment service provider for the other.
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\subsection{Change and Divisibility}
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Customers do not always have the right set of coins available to exactly cover
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the amount to be paid to a merchant. With physical cash, the store would
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give the customer change. For e-cash, the situation is more complex, as
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the customer would have to make sure that the change has not already been
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spent, does not violate their anonymity and the merchant does not have a
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digital ``copy'' of the change tokens that the merchant can spend before the customer. Note
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that it would be unwise to always withdraw the correct amount of e-cash
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directly before a purchase, as it creates a temporal correlation between the
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non-anonymous withdrawal event and the spending event.
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Most modern e-cash schemes instead deal with exact spending by providing
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\emph{divisibility} of coins, where the customer can decide to only spend part
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of a coin. A significant chunk of the e-cash literature has been concerned
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with developing schemes that allow the individual, divided parts of a coin to
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be unlinkable (thus preserving anonymity) and to optimize the storage costs for
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wallets and the communication cost of withdrawals.
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The current state of the art for divisible e-cash~\cite{pointcheval2017cut}
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achieves constant-time withdrawal and wallet storage cost for coins that can be
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split into an arbitrary but fixed (as a system parameter) number of pieces. A
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continuous ``chunk'' of the smallest pieces of a coin can be spent with
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constant-time communication complexity.
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While this sounds attractive in theory, these results are mostly of academic
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interest, as the storage and/or computational complexity for the party that is
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checking for double spending of coins remains enormous: each smallest piece of
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every coin needs to be recorded and checked individually. When paying
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$\$10.00$ with a coin that supports division into cent pieces, $1000$
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individual coin pieces must be checked for double spending and recorded,
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possibliy in compressed form to trade storage costs for more computation.
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For GNU Taler, we use a rather simple and practical approach, made possible by
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requiring participants to be online during spending: coins can be fractionally
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spent without having divisible, unlinkable parts. The remaining value on a coin
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that was spend (and thus revealed) can be used to withdraw fresh, unlinkable
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coins. The protocol to obtain change takes additional measures to ensure that
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it cannot be misused to facilitate untaxed transactions. Giving change for
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e-cash has been proposed before \cite{brickell1995trustee,tracz2001fair}, but
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to the best of our knowledge, the idea of income-transparent change is novel.
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\subsection{Anonymity Control}
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Some proposed e-cash protocols contain mechanisms to allow selective
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deanonymization of transactions for scenarios involving crime
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\cite{sander1999escrow}, specifically blackmailing and tax evasion.
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Unfortunately this does not really work as a countermeasure against
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blackmailing in practice. As noted in the paper that initially described such
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a mechanism for blind signatures \cite{stadler1995fair}, a blackmailer could
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simply request to be paid directly with plain, blindly signed coins, and
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thereby completely circumvent the threat of revocable anonymity.
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GNU Taler provides \emph{income transparency} as a measure against tax evasion.
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We furthermore describe a different approach in a blackmailing scenario in
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Section~\ref{sec:design:blackmailing}, which we believe is more practical in
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dissuading blackmailers in practice.
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\subsection{User Suspension}
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Anonymous user suspension \cite{au2011electronic} has been proposed as
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another mechanism to punish users suspected in illicit activities by
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preventing then from making further transactions until the suspension is
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lifted. Anonymous suspension is based on transactions; the user
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involved in a particular transaction is suspended, but their identity is not
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revealed.
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While the approach is interesting, it is not practical, as it requires
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a single permanent key pair to be associated with each user. If a
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user claims they lost their private key and requests a new key pair,
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their suspension would be effectively lifted. Suspending users from a
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dominant payment system is also socially problematic, as excluding
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them from most commercial activities would likely be a
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disproportionate and cruel punishment.
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\subsection{Transferability}
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Transferability is a feature of certain e-cash systems that allows
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transfer of e-cash between two parties without breaking anonymity
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properties \cite{fuchsbauer2009transferable}. Contemporary systems
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that offer this type of disintermediation attract criminal
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activity~\cite{richet2016extortion}.
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GNU Taler specifically provides roughly the \emph{opposite} of this property,
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namely \emph{income transparency}, to guarantee that e-cash is not easily
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abused for tax evasion. Mutually trusting users, however, can share ownership
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of a coin.
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\subsection{Atomic Swaps}
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Atomic swaps (often called ``fair exchange'' in the e-cash literature) are a
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feature of some e-cash systems that allows e-cash
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to be exchanged against some service or (digital) product, with a trusted third
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party ensuring that the payee receives the payment if and only if they correctly
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provided the merchandise.
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GNU Taler supports Camenisch-style atomic swaps~\cite{camenisch2007endorsed},
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as explained in Section~\ref{sec:security:atomic-swaps}.
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\subsection{Refunds}
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GNU Taler allows merchants to provide refunds to customers during a limited
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time after the coins for the payment were deposited. The merchant signs a
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statement that effectively allows the customer to reclaim a previously spent
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coin. Customers can request anonymous change for the reclaimed amount.
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While this is a rather simple extension, we are not aware of any other e-cash
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system that supports refunds.
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\section{User Experience and Performance} \label{sec:intro:ux}
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For adoption of a payment system, the user experience is critical. Thus,
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before diving into {\em how} GNU Taler is implemented, we begin by
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showing how GNU Taler {\em looks} from the perspective of an end user in the
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context of web payments, in a desktop browser (Chromium).
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To use GNU Taler, the user must first install a browser extension
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(Figure~\ref{fig:ux:install-prompt}). Once installed, the user can
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open a pop-up window by clicking on the Taler logo, to see the
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initially empty wallet balance (Figure~\ref{fig:ux:installed}).
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The customer logs into their online bank---a simple demo bank in our case--to
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withdraw digital cash from their bank account into their wallet (Figures~%
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\ref{fig:ux:bank-login} and~\ref{fig:ux:bank-profile}). Our demo uses
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\textsc{Kudos} as an imaginary currency. Before the user is asked to confirm,
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they are given the option to view details about or change the default exchange
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provider, the GNU Taler payment service provider (Figure~\ref{fig:ux:select-exchange}).
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With a real bank, a second factor (such as a mobile TAN) would now be requested
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from the user. Our demo instead asks the user to solve a simple CAPTCHA
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(Figure~\ref{fig:ux:pin-tan}). The amount withdrawn---minus withdrawal
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fees---is now available as e-cash in the wallet (Figure~%
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\ref{fig:ux:withdraw-done}).
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The customer can now go to an online shop to spend their digital cash. We've
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implemented a shop that sells single chapters from Richard Stallman's essay
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collection ``Free Software, Free Society'' \cite{stallman2002essays} (Figure~%
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\ref{fig:ux:essay-landing}). The user selects an essay, and is then
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immediately presented with a confirmation page rendered by the wallet (Figure~\ref{fig:ux:essay-pay}).
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After paying, the user can immediately read the article (Figure~\ref{fig:ux:essay-done}).
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Our benchmarks, discussed in Chapter \ref{chapter:implementation} show that a
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single machine can support around 1000 payments per second, and our
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implementation is easily amenable to further scaling.
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The extra computation required in the customer's wallet is in the order of a
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few hundred milliseconds even on typical mobile or tablet devices, and thus
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barely noticeable.
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/wallet-install-prompt.png}
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\caption{The user is prompted to install the wallet.}
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\label{fig:ux:install-prompt}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/wallet-installed.png}
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\caption{The wallet popup shows an empty balance.}
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\label{fig:ux:installed}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/bank-login.png}
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\caption{The bank asks for login details.}
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\label{fig:ux:bank-login}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/bank-profile.png}
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\caption{Account page of the demo bank.}
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\label{fig:ux:bank-profile}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/withdraw-confirm.png}
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\caption{Exchange selection dialog in the wallet.}
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\label{fig:ux:select-exchange}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/pin-tan.png}
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\caption{PIN/TAN dialog of the demo bank.}
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\label{fig:ux:pin-tan}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/withdraw-done.png}
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\caption{After a successful withdrawal, the balance is shown in the wallet.}
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\label{fig:ux:withdraw-done}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/essay-landing.png}
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\caption{Landing page of a store that sells essays.}
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\label{fig:ux:essay-landing}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/essay-pay.png}
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\caption[Payment prompt for an essay.]{Payment prompt for an essay. Rendered by the wallet.}
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\label{fig:ux:essay-pay}
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\end{figure}
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\begin{figure}
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\centering
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{taler-screenshots/essay-done.png}
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\caption{Essay successfully purchased by the user.}
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\label{fig:ux:essay-done}
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\end{figure}
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%\begin{figure}
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%\begin{subfigure}{.5\textwidth}
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% \centering
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% \includegraphics[width=.8\linewidth]{taler-screenshots/wallet-installed.png}
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% \caption{1a}
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% \label{fig:sfig1}
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%\end{subfigure}%
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%\begin{subfigure}{.5\textwidth}
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% \centering
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% \includegraphics[width=.8\linewidth]{taler-screenshots/bank-login.png}
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% \caption{1b}
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% \label{fig:sfig2}
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|
%\end{subfigure}
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%\caption{plots of....}
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%\label{fig:fig}
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|
%\end{figure}
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|
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|
% FIXME: perf results
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|
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\section{The Technical Foundation: Anonymous E-Cash} \label{sec:intro:ecash}
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|
GNU Taler is based on anonymous e-cash. Anonymous e-cash was invented by David
|
|
Chaum in the 1980s \cite{chaum1983blind}. The idea behind Chaumian e-cash is
|
|
both simple and ingenious, and can be best illustrated
|
|
with the carbon paper\footnote{%
|
|
Carbon paper is a paper coated with pigment (originally carbon) on one side.
|
|
When put face-down between two sheets of normal paper, the pressure from
|
|
writing with a pen or typewriter on the first layer causes pigment to be
|
|
deposited on the paper beneath, allowing a copy to be made.
|
|
} analogy: A long, random serial number is generated, for example, by throwing
|
|
a die a few dozen times, and written on a piece of paper. A carbon paper is
|
|
placed on top, with the pigmented side facing down, and both pieces of paper
|
|
are put into an opaque envelope. The envelope is now sealed and brought to a
|
|
bank. The bank draws a signature on the outside of the envelope, which presses
|
|
through to the piece of paper with the serial number. In exchange for the
|
|
signed envelope, the bank deducts a fixed amount (say five dollars) from the
|
|
customer's bank account. Under the (admittedly rather strong) assumption that
|
|
the bank's signature cannot be forged, the signed piece of paper with the serial
|
|
number is now an untraceable bank note worth five dollars, as the bank signed
|
|
it without seeing the serial number inside the envelope! Since the signed
|
|
paper can be easily copied, merchants that accept it as payment must check the
|
|
bank's signature, call the bank and transmit the serial number. The bank keeps
|
|
a register of all serial numbers that have been used as payment before. If the
|
|
serial number is already in the bank's register, the bank informs the merchant
|
|
about the attempted double spending, and the merchant then rejects the payment.
|
|
|
|
The digital analogue of this process is called a \emph{blind signature}, where
|
|
the signer knows that it gave a digital signature, but does not know the
|
|
contents of the message that it signed.
|
|
|
|
In this document, we use \emph{coin} to refer to a token of value in an e-cash
|
|
system. Note that the analogy of a coin does not always hold up, as certain
|
|
types of operations possible in some e-cash schemes, such as partial spending,
|
|
divisibility, etc., do not transfer to physical coins.
|
|
|
|
|
|
%\subsection{Security Properties}\label{sec:intro:security}
|
|
|
|
We have the following security and correctness properties for GNU Taler
|
|
(formally defined in Chapter~\ref{chapter:security}):
|
|
\begin{itemize}
|
|
\item \emph{Anonymity} guarantees that transactions cannot be correlated with withdrawals or
|
|
other transactions made by the same customer.
|
|
\item \emph{Unforgeability} guarantees that users cannot spend more e-cash than they withdrew.
|
|
\item \emph{Conservation} guarantees that customers do not lose money due to
|
|
interrupted protocols or malicious merchants; they can always obtain
|
|
anonymous change or a proof of successful spending.
|
|
\item \emph{Income transparency} guarantees that mutually distrusting parties
|
|
are unable to reliably transfer e-cash between them without the income of
|
|
participants being visible to tax auditors.
|
|
\end{itemize}
|
|
|
|
While anonymity and unforgeability are common properties of e-cash, we are not
|
|
aware of any other treatments of income transparency and conservation.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\section{Roadmap}
|
|
|
|
Chapter \ref{chapter:design} describes the high-level design of GNU Taler, and
|
|
compares it to payment systems found in the academic literature and real-world
|
|
usage. Chapter \ref{chapter:security} first gives a gentle introduction to
|
|
provable security (which can be skipped by readers with a background in
|
|
cryptography), and then defines security properties for income-transparent,
|
|
anonymous e-cash. The cryptographic protocols for GNU Taler are defined in
|
|
detail, and proofs are given that our protocols satisfy the security
|
|
properties defined earlier. In Chapter \ref{chapter:implementation}, the
|
|
implementation of GNU Taler is described, and the performance and scalability
|
|
is evaluated. Chapter \ref{chapter:future-work} discusses future work and
|
|
missing pieces to deploy GNU Taler in production. Chapter
|
|
\ref{chapter:conclusion} concludes with an outlook on the potential impact and
|
|
practical relevance of this work.
|
|
|