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-deduplicate logic

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This commit is contained in:
Christian Grothoff 2022-07-04 23:25:51 +02:00
parent 84c78612f3
commit e68206b1f9
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GPG Key ID: 939E6BE1E29FC3CC
1 changed files with 68 additions and 131 deletions
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199
src/auditor/taler-helper-auditor-coins.c
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@ -1197,6 +1197,65 @@ check_known_coin (
}
/**
* Update the denom balance in @a dso reducing it by
* @a amount_with_fee. If this is not possible, report
* an emergency. Also updates the #total_escrow_balance.
*
* @param dso denomination summary to update
* @param rowid responsible row (for logging)
* @param amount_with_fee amount to subtract
*/
static void
reduce_denom_balance (struct DenominationSummary *dso,
uint64_t rowid,
const struct TALER_Amount *amount_with_fee)
{
struct TALER_Amount tmp;
if (TALER_ARL_SR_INVALID_NEGATIVE ==
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract_neg (&tmp,
&dso->denom_balance,
amount_with_fee))
{
TALER_ARL_amount_add (&dso->denom_loss,
&dso->denom_loss,
amount_with_fee);
dso->report_emergency = true;
}
else
{
dso->denom_balance = tmp;
}
if (-1 == TALER_amount_cmp (&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee))
{
/* This can theoretically happen if for example the exchange
never issued any coins (i.e. escrow balance is zero), but
accepted a forged coin (i.e. emergency situation after
private key compromise). In that case, we cannot even
subtract the profit we make from the fee from the escrow
balance. Tested as part of test-auditor.sh, case #18 */
report_amount_arithmetic_inconsistency (
"subtracting amount from escrow balance",
rowid,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee,
0);
}
else
{
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee);
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"New balance of denomination `%s' is %s\n",
GNUNET_h2s (&dso->issue->denom_hash.hash),
TALER_amount2s (&dso->denom_balance));
}
/**
* Function called with details about coins that were melted, with the
* goal of auditing the refresh's execution. Verifies the signature
@ -1230,7 +1289,6 @@ refresh_session_cb (void *cls,
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_DenominationKeyInformation *issue;
struct DenominationSummary *dso;
struct TALER_Amount amount_without_fee;
struct TALER_Amount tmp;
enum GNUNET_DB_QueryStatus qs;
(void) noreveal_index;
@ -1462,47 +1520,9 @@ refresh_session_cb (void *cls,
}
else
{
// FIXME: refactor: repeated logic!
if (TALER_ARL_SR_INVALID_NEGATIVE ==
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract_neg (&tmp,
&dso->denom_balance,
amount_with_fee))
{
TALER_ARL_amount_add (&dso->denom_loss,
&dso->denom_loss,
amount_with_fee);
dso->report_emergency = true;
}
else
{
dso->denom_balance = tmp;
}
if (-1 == TALER_amount_cmp (&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee))
{
/* This can theoretically happen if for example the exchange
never issued any coins (i.e. escrow balance is zero), but
accepted a forged coin (i.e. emergency situation after
private key compromise). In that case, we cannot even
subtract the profit we make from the fee from the escrow
balance. Tested as part of test-auditor.sh, case #18 */
report_amount_arithmetic_inconsistency (
"subtracting refresh fee from escrow balance",
rowid,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee,
0);
}
else
{
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee);
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"New balance of denomination `%s' after melt is %s\n",
GNUNET_h2s (&issue->denom_hash.hash),
TALER_amount2s (&dso->denom_balance));
reduce_denom_balance (dso,
rowid,
amount_with_fee);
}
/* update global melt fees */
@ -1648,51 +1668,9 @@ deposit_cb (void *cls,
}
else
{
struct TALER_Amount tmp;
// FIXME: refactor: repeated logic!
if (TALER_ARL_SR_INVALID_NEGATIVE ==
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract_neg (&tmp,
&ds->denom_balance,
&deposit->amount_with_fee))
{
TALER_ARL_amount_add (&ds->denom_loss,
&ds->denom_loss,
&deposit->amount_with_fee);
ds->report_emergency = true;
}
else
{
ds->denom_balance = tmp;
}
if (-1 == TALER_amount_cmp (&total_escrow_balance,
&deposit->amount_with_fee))
{
/* This can theoretically happen if for example the exchange
never issued any coins (i.e. escrow balance is zero), but
accepted a forged coin (i.e. emergency situation after
private key compromise). In that case, we cannot even
subtract the profit we make from the fee from the escrow
balance. Tested as part of test-auditor.sh, case #18 */
report_amount_arithmetic_inconsistency (
"subtracting deposit fee from escrow balance",
rowid,
&total_escrow_balance,
&deposit->amount_with_fee,
0);
}
else
{
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
&deposit->amount_with_fee);
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"New balance of denomination `%s' after deposit is %s\n",
GNUNET_h2s (&issue->denom_hash.hash),
TALER_amount2s (&ds->denom_balance));
reduce_denom_balance (ds,
rowid,
&deposit->amount_with_fee);
}
/* update global deposit fees */
@ -2449,50 +2427,9 @@ purse_deposit_cb (
}
else
{
struct TALER_Amount tmp;
// FIXME: refactor: repeated logic!
if (TALER_ARL_SR_INVALID_NEGATIVE ==
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract_neg (&tmp,
&ds->denom_balance,
&deposit->amount))
{
TALER_ARL_amount_add (&ds->denom_loss,
&ds->denom_loss,
&deposit->amount);
ds->report_emergency = true;
}
else
{
ds->denom_balance = tmp;
}
if (-1 == TALER_amount_cmp (&total_escrow_balance,
&deposit->amount))
{
/* This can theoretically happen if for example the exchange
never issued any coins (i.e. escrow balance is zero), but
accepted a forged coin (i.e. emergency situation after
private key compromise). In that case, we cannot even
subtract the profit we make from the fee from the escrow
balance. Tested as part of test-auditor.sh, case #18 */
report_amount_arithmetic_inconsistency (
"subtracting purse deposit fee from escrow balance",
rowid,
&total_escrow_balance,
&deposit->amount,
0);
}
else
{
TALER_ARL_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
&deposit->amount);
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"New balance of denomination `%s' after purse deposit is %s\n",
GNUNET_h2s (&issue->denom_hash.hash),
TALER_amount2s (&ds->denom_balance));
reduce_denom_balance (ds,
rowid,
&deposit->amount);
}
/* update global deposit fees */