misc minor edits, and a FIXME for Jeff
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@ -19,6 +19,13 @@
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pages = {11-15},
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pages = {11-15},
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}
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}
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@misc{BOLT,
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author = {Matthew Green and Ian Miers},
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title = {Bolt: Anonymous Payment Channels for Decentralized Currencies},
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howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/701},
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year = {2016},
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note = {\url{http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/701}},
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}
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@Misc{greece2015cash,
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@Misc{greece2015cash,
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author = {Reuters},
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author = {Reuters},
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@ -77,7 +77,7 @@
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\begin{abstract}
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\begin{abstract}
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This paper introduces {\em Taler}, a Chaum-style digital currency that
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This paper introduces {\em Taler}, a Chaum-style digital currency that
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enables anonymous payments while ensuring that entities that receive
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enables anonymous payments while ensuring that entities that receive
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payments are auditable and thus taxable. In Taler, customers can
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payments are auditable. In Taler, customers can
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never defraud anyone, merchants can only fail to deliver the
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never defraud anyone, merchants can only fail to deliver the
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merchandise to the customer, and payment service providers can be
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merchandise to the customer, and payment service providers can be
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fully audited. All parties receive cryptographic evidence for all
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fully audited. All parties receive cryptographic evidence for all
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@ -88,10 +88,10 @@ systems that do not provide for privacy.
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The key technical contribution underpinning Taler is a new {\em
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The key technical contribution underpinning Taler is a new {\em
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refresh protocol} which allows fractional payments and refunds while
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refresh protocol} which allows fractional payments and refunds while
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maintaining anonymity of the customer and unlinkability of
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maintaining untraceability of the customer and unlinkability of
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transactions. The refresh protocol combines an efficient
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transactions. The refresh protocol combines an
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cut-and-choose mechanism with a {\em link} step to ensure that
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efficient cut-and-choose mechanism with a {\em link} step to ensure
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refreshing is not abused for transactional payments.
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that refreshing is not abused for transactional payments.
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We argue that Taler provides a secure digital currency for modern
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We argue that Taler provides a secure digital currency for modern
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liberal societies as it is a flexible, libre and efficient protocol
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liberal societies as it is a flexible, libre and efficient protocol
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@ -106,11 +106,11 @@ developed nation states have adopted highly transparent payment systems,
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such as the MasterCard and VisaCard credit card schemes and computerized
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such as the MasterCard and VisaCard credit card schemes and computerized
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bank transactions such as SWIFT. These systems enable mass surveillance
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bank transactions such as SWIFT. These systems enable mass surveillance
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by both governments and private companies. Aspects of this surveillance
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by both governments and private companies. Aspects of this surveillance
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sometimes benifit society by providing information about tax evasion or
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sometimes benefit society by providing information about tax evasion or
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crimes like extortion. % TODO : anti-money laundering later?
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crimes like extortion. % TODO : anti-money laundering later?
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In particular, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who can
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In particular, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who can
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afford to escape the dragnet.
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afford to escape the dragnet.
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%
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At the other extreme, weaker developing nation states have economic
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At the other extreme, weaker developing nation states have economic
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activity based largely on coins, paper money or even barter. Here,
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activity based largely on coins, paper money or even barter. Here,
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the state is often unable to effectively monitor or tax economic
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the state is often unable to effectively monitor or tax economic
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@ -122,20 +122,19 @@ ZeroCoin~\cite{miers2013zerocoin} is an example for translating an
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anarchistic economy into the digital realm.
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anarchistic economy into the digital realm.
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This paper describes Taler, a simple and practical payment system for
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This paper describes Taler, a simple and practical payment system for
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a modern social-liberal society, which is not being served well by
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a social-liberal society, which is underserved by
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current payment systems which enable either an authoritarian state in
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current payment systems.
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total control of the population, or create weak states with almost
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anarchistic economies.
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The Taler protocol is influenced by ideas from
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The Taler protocol is influenced by ideas from
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} and also follows Chaum's basic architecture of
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} and also follows Chaum's basic
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customer, merchant and exchange (Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}).
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architecture of customer, merchant and exchange
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The two designs share the key first step where the {\em customer}
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}). The two designs share the key first step
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withdraws digital {\em coins} from the {\em exchange} with unlinkability
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where the {\em customer} withdraws digital {\em coins} from the {\em
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provided via blind signatures. The coins can then be spent at a
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exchange} with unlinkability provided via blind signatures. The
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{\em merchant} who {\em deposits} them at the exchange.
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coins can then be spent at a {\em merchant} who {\em deposits} them at
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Taler uses online detection of double-spending, thus assuring the merchant
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the exchange. Taler uses online detection of double-spending and
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instantly that a transaction is valid.
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provides excuplability via cryptographic proofs. Thus merchants are
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instantly assured that a transaction is valid.
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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\centering
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@ -159,16 +158,14 @@ instantly that a transaction is valid.
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\label{fig:cmm}
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\label{fig:cmm}
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\end{figure}
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\end{figure}
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A key issue for an efficient Chaumian digital payment system is the
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A key issue for an efficient Chaumian digital payment system is the
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need to provide change. For example, a customer may want to pay
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need to provide change. For example, a customer may want to pay
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\EUR{49,99}, but has withdrawn a \EUR{100,00} coin. Withdrawng 10,000
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\EUR{49,99}, but has withdrawn a \EUR{100,00} coin. Withdrawing 10,000
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pieces with a denomination of \EUR{0,01} and transferring 4,999 would
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coins with a denomination of \EUR{0,01} and transferring 4,999 coins would
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be too inefficient, even for modern systems. The customer should not
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be too inefficient. The customer should not
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withdraw exact change from her account, as doing so reduces anonymity
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withdraw exact change from her account, as doing so reduces anonymity
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due to the obvious corrolation. A practical payment system must thus
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due to the obvious correlation. A practical payment system must thus
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support giving change in the form of spendable coins, say a \EUR{0,01}
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support giving change.
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coin and a \EUR{50,00} coin.
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Taler solves the problem of giving change by introducing a new
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Taler solves the problem of giving change by introducing a new
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{\em refresh protocol}. Using this protocol, a customer can obtain
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{\em refresh protocol}. Using this protocol, a customer can obtain
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@ -216,6 +213,15 @@ Yet, there are several major irredeemable problems inherent in their designs:
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% currency exchange and exacerbates the problems with currency fluctuations.
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% currency exchange and exacerbates the problems with currency fluctuations.
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\end{itemize}
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\end{itemize}
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Anonymity extensions for BitCoin such as ZeroCoin~\cite{miers2013zerocoin}
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and BOLT~\cite{BOLT} are also limited to transactions with coins
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of fixed discrete value, creating problems with giving change we
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outlined in the introduction. Furthermore, these extensions have
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problems with aborted transactions, which can reduce the anonymity
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set. Taler's refresh protocol also addresses the problem of aborted
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transactions, ensuring that aborts cannot be used to attack the
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privacy assurances of the system.
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%GreenCoinX\footnote{\url{https://www.greencoinx.com/}} is a more
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%GreenCoinX\footnote{\url{https://www.greencoinx.com/}} is a more
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%recent AltCoin where the company promises to identify the owner of
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%recent AltCoin where the company promises to identify the owner of
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%each coin via e-mail addresses and phone numbers. While it is unclear
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%each coin via e-mail addresses and phone numbers. While it is unclear
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@ -318,19 +324,22 @@ description of the Opencoin protocol is available to date.
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The Taler system comprises three principal types of actors
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The Taler system comprises three principal types of actors
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}): The \emph{customer} is interested in receiving
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}): The \emph{customer} is interested in receiving
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goods or services from the \emph{merchant} in exchange for payment.
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goods or services from the \emph{merchant} in exchange for payment.
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When making a transaction, both the customer and the merchant use the
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To pay, the customer {\em spends} digital coins at the merchant. When
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same \emph{exchange}, which serves as a payment service provider for
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making a transaction, both the customer and the merchant use the same
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the financial transaction between the two. The exchange is
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\emph{exchange}, which serves as a payment service provider for the
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responsible for allowing the customer to convert financial reserves to
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financial transaction between the two. The exchange is responsible
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the anonymous digital coins, and for enabling the merchant to convert
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for allowing the customer to withdraw anonymous digital coins from the
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spent digital coins back to funds in a financial reserve. In
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customer's financial reserves, and for enabling the merchant to
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addition, we describe an \emph{auditor} who assures customers and
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deposit digital coins in return for receiving credit at the merchant's
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merchants that the exchange operates correctly.
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financial reserve. In addition, Taler includes an \emph{auditor} who
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assures customers and merchants that the exchange operates correctly.
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\subsection{Security model}
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\subsection{Security model}
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Taler's security model assumes that cryptographic primitives are
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Taler's security model assumes that cryptographic primitives are
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secure and that each participant is under full control of his system.
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secure and that each participant is under full control of his system.
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% FIXME: Jeff, can you concisely state the precise assumpitons?
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% (i.e. hardness of EC-DLOG for refresh, RSA assumption, hash collision resistance (?))
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The contact information of the exchange is known to both customer and
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The contact information of the exchange is known to both customer and
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merchant from the start. We further assume that the customer can
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merchant from the start. We further assume that the customer can
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authenticate the merchant, e.g. using X.509
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authenticate the merchant, e.g. using X.509
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@ -342,10 +351,9 @@ The exchange is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to forward
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them when receiving the respective deposit instructions from the
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them when receiving the respective deposit instructions from the
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merchants. Customer and merchant can have assurances about the
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merchants. Customer and merchant can have assurances about the
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exchange's liquidity and operation though published audits by
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exchange's liquidity and operation though published audits by
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financial regulators or other trusted third parties. If sufficently
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financial regulators or other trusted third parties.
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regular, audits of the exchange's accounts should reveal any possible
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Online signing keys expire regularly, allowing the exchange to
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fraud. Online signing keys expire regularly, allowing the exchange to
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eventually destroy the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs.
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destroy the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs.
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The merchant is trusted to deliver the service or goods to the
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The merchant is trusted to deliver the service or goods to the
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customer upon receiving payment. The customer can seek legal relief
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customer upon receiving payment. The customer can seek legal relief
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@ -356,9 +364,9 @@ Neither the merchant nor the customer have any ability to {\em effectively}
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defraud the exchange or the state collecting taxes. Here, ``effectively''
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defraud the exchange or the state collecting taxes. Here, ``effectively''
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means that the expected return for fraud is negative.
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means that the expected return for fraud is negative.
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%
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%
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Note that customers do not need to be trusted in any way, and that in
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%Note that customers do not need to be trusted in any way, and that in
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particular it is never necessary for anyone to try to recover funds
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%particular it is never necessary for anyone to try to recover funds
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from customers using legal coersion.
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%from customers using legal coersion.
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\subsection{Taxability and Entities}
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\subsection{Taxability and Entities}
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@ -439,7 +447,7 @@ is unable to link the known identity of the customer that withdrew
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anonymous digital coins to the {\em purchase} performed later at the
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anonymous digital coins to the {\em purchase} performed later at the
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merchant.
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merchant.
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While the customer thus has anonymity for purchases, the exchange will
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While the customer thus has untraceability for purchases, the exchange will
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always learn the merchant's identity in order to credit the merchant's
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always learn the merchant's identity in order to credit the merchant's
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account. This is also necessary for taxation, as Taler deliberately
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account. This is also necessary for taxation, as Taler deliberately
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exposes these events as anchors for tax audits on income.
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exposes these events as anchors for tax audits on income.
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@ -1167,11 +1175,11 @@ the participants have to disclose their core secrets.
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\bibliographystyle{alpha}
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\bibliographystyle{alpha}
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\bibliography{taler,rfc}
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\bibliography{taler,rfc}
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\vfill
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%\vfill
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\begin{center}
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%\begin{center}
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\Large Demonstration available at \url{https://demo.taler.net/}
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% \Large Demonstration available at \url{https://demo.taler.net/}
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\end{center}
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%\end{center}
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\vfill
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%\vfill
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\newpage
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\newpage
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\appendix
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\appendix
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