finished implementing session-hash based reveal checking

This commit is contained in:
Christian Grothoff 2016-08-11 22:43:26 +02:00
parent bcd5a51a7e
commit dd724c009d
3 changed files with 17 additions and 122 deletions

View File

@ -1109,9 +1109,6 @@ TMH_DB_execute_refresh_melt (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
* @param session database connection to use
* @param session_hash hash of session to query
* @param rm details about the original melt
* @param off commitment offset to check
* @param index index of the mismatch, UINT_MAX if there is no such index
* @param object_name name of the object with the problem
* @return #GNUNET_NO if we generated the error message
* #GNUNET_SYSERR if we could not even generate an error message
*/
@ -1119,10 +1116,7 @@ static int
send_melt_commitment_error (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_Session *session,
const struct GNUNET_HashCode *session_hash,
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_RefreshMelt *rm,
unsigned int off,
unsigned int index,
const char *object_name)
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_RefreshMelt *rm)
{
struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_MeltCommitment *mc;
int ret;
@ -1141,10 +1135,7 @@ send_melt_commitment_error (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
ret = (MHD_YES ==
TMH_RESPONSE_reply_refresh_reveal_missmatch (connection,
rm,
mc,
off,
index,
object_name))
mc))
? GNUNET_NO : GNUNET_SYSERR;
TMH_plugin->free_melt_commitment (TMH_plugin->cls,
mc);
@ -1183,66 +1174,16 @@ check_commitment (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
const struct TALER_DenominationPublicKey *denom_pubs,
struct GNUNET_HashContext *hash_context)
{
struct TALER_TransferPublicKeyP transfer_pub;
struct TALER_TransferSecretP transfer_secret;
struct TALER_TransferPublicKeyP transfer_pub_check;
struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_RefreshCommitCoin *commit_coins;
unsigned int j;
int ret;
/* FIXME: instead of consulting DB, reconstruct everything
from transfer_priv here! */
if (GNUNET_OK !=
TMH_plugin->get_refresh_transfer_public_key (TMH_plugin->cls,
session,
session_hash,
off,
&transfer_pub))
{
GNUNET_break (0);
return (MHD_YES == TMH_RESPONSE_reply_internal_db_error (connection))
? GNUNET_NO : GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
GNUNET_CRYPTO_ecdhe_key_get_public (&transfer_priv->ecdhe_priv,
&transfer_pub_check.ecdhe_pub);
if (0 !=
memcmp (&transfer_pub_check,
&transfer_pub,
sizeof (struct TALER_TransferPublicKeyP)))
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
return send_melt_commitment_error (connection,
session,
session_hash,
melt,
off,
UINT_MAX,
"transfer key");
}
TALER_link_reveal_transfer_secret (transfer_priv,
&melt->coin.coin_pub,
&transfer_secret);
/* Check that the commitments for all new coins were correct */
commit_coins = GNUNET_new_array (num_newcoins,
struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_RefreshCommitCoin);
if (GNUNET_OK !=
TMH_plugin->get_refresh_commit_coins (TMH_plugin->cls,
session,
session_hash,
off,
num_newcoins,
commit_coins))
{
GNUNET_break (0);
GNUNET_free (commit_coins);
return (MHD_YES == TMH_RESPONSE_reply_internal_db_error (connection))
? GNUNET_NO : GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
for (j = 0; j < num_newcoins; j++)
{
struct TALER_FreshCoinP fc;
@ -1268,44 +1209,16 @@ check_commitment (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
{
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_ERROR,
"Blind failed (bad denomination key!?)\n");
ret = (MHD_YES == TMH_RESPONSE_reply_internal_error (connection,
return (MHD_YES == TMH_RESPONSE_reply_internal_error (connection,
"Blinding error"))
? GNUNET_NO : GNUNET_SYSERR;
goto cleanup;
}
if ( (buf_len != commit_coins[j].coin_ev_size) ||
(0 != memcmp (buf,
commit_coins[j].coin_ev,
buf_len)) )
{
GNUNET_break_op (0);
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
"blind envelope does not match for k=%u, old=%d\n",
off,
(int) j);
GNUNET_free (buf);
ret = send_melt_commitment_error (connection,
session,
session_hash,
melt,
off,
j,
"envelope");
goto cleanup;
? GNUNET_NO : GNUNET_SYSERR;
}
GNUNET_CRYPTO_hash_context_read (hash_context,
commit_coins[j].coin_ev,
commit_coins[j].coin_ev_size);
buf,
buf_len);
GNUNET_free (buf);
}
ret = GNUNET_OK;
cleanup:
for (j = 0; j < num_newcoins; j++)
GNUNET_free (commit_coins[j].coin_ev);
GNUNET_free (commit_coins);
return ret;
return GNUNET_OK;
}
@ -1622,6 +1535,7 @@ TMH_DB_execute_refresh_reveal (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
GNUNET_break_op (0);
for (j=0;j<refresh_session.num_newcoins;j++)
GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_free (denom_pubs[j].rsa_public_key);
GNUNET_free (commit_coins);
GNUNET_free (denom_pubs);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_signature_free (refresh_session.melt.coin.denom_sig.rsa_signature);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_free (refresh_session.melt.coin.denom_pub.rsa_public_key);
@ -1643,9 +1557,11 @@ TMH_DB_execute_refresh_reveal (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
GNUNET_free (denom_pubs);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_signature_free (refresh_session.melt.coin.denom_sig.rsa_signature);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_free (refresh_session.melt.coin.denom_pub.rsa_public_key);
return (MHD_YES == TMH_RESPONSE_reply_external_error (connection,
"session hash does not match"))
? GNUNET_NO : GNUNET_SYSERR;
return send_melt_commitment_error (connection,
session,
session_hash,
&refresh_session.melt);
}
/* Client request OK, start transaction */

View File

@ -974,21 +974,12 @@ TMH_RESPONSE_reply_refresh_reveal_success (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
* @param connection the connection to send the response to
* @param rm details about the original melt
* @param mc all information about the original commitment
* @param off offset in the array of kappa-commitments where
* the missmatch was detected
* @param j index of the coin for which the missmatch was
* detected
* @param missmatch_object name of the object that was
* bogus (i.e. "transfer key").
* @return a MHD result code
*/
int
TMH_RESPONSE_reply_refresh_reveal_missmatch (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_RefreshMelt *rm,
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_MeltCommitment *mc,
unsigned int off,
unsigned int j,
const char *missmatch_object)
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_MeltCommitment *mc)
{
json_t *info_new;
json_t *info_commit;
@ -1061,15 +1052,12 @@ TMH_RESPONSE_reply_refresh_reveal_missmatch (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
}
return TMH_RESPONSE_reply_json_pack (connection,
MHD_HTTP_CONFLICT,
"{s:s, s:i, s:i, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:s}",
"{s:s, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o}",
"error", "commitment violation",
"offset", (int) off,
"index", (int) j,
"refresh_melt_info", rm_json,
"newcoin_infos", info_new,
"commit_infos", info_commit,
"link_infos", info_links,
"object", missmatch_object);
"link_infos", info_links);
}

View File

@ -494,21 +494,12 @@ TMH_RESPONSE_reply_refresh_reveal_success (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
* @param connection the connection to send the response to
* @param rm details about the original melt
* @param mc all information about the original commitment
* @param off offset in the array of kappa-commitments where
* the missmatch was detected
* @param j index of the coin for which the missmatch was
* detected
* @param missmatch_object name of the object that was
* bogus (i.e. "transfer key").
* @return a MHD result code
*/
int
TMH_RESPONSE_reply_refresh_reveal_missmatch (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_RefreshMelt *rm,
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_MeltCommitment *mc,
unsigned int off,
unsigned int j,
const char *missmatch_object);
const struct TALER_EXCHANGEDB_MeltCommitment *mc);
/**