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Update to taxability

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Jeffrey Burdges 2017-05-13 15:06:09 +02:00
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doc/paper/taler.tex
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@ -1376,23 +1376,29 @@ data being persisted are represented in between $\langle\rangle$.
\section{Taxability arguments}
We assume the exchange operates honestly when discussing taxability.
We feel this assumption is warratned mostly because a Taler exchange
requires liscenses to operate as a financial institution, which it
risks loosing if it knowingly facilitates tax evasion.
We also expect an auditor monitors the exchange similarly to how
government regulators monitor financial institutions.
In fact, our auditor software component gives the auditor read access
to the exchange's database, and carries out test operations anonymously,
which expands its power over conventional auditors.
\begin{proposition}
An auditor can detect an exchange operating either the refresh or
linking protocol dishonestly.
Assuming the exchange operates the refresh protocol honestly,
a customer operating the refresh protocol dishonestly expects to
loose $1 - {1 \over \kappa}$ of the value of thei coins.
\end{proposition}
\begin{proof}
.. Not sure about this one ..
\end{proof}
\begin{proposition}
If the exchange operates the refresh protocol honestly, then
a dishonest wallet looses $1 - {1 \over \kappa}$ of the value
of the coins it refreshes dishonestly.
\end{proposition}
\begin{proof}
.. Can we reference something about cut and choose protocols? Or must we work this all out? ..
An honest esxchange keeps any funds being refreshed if the reveal
phase is never carried out, does not match the commitment, or shows
an incorrect commitment. As a result, a customer dishonestly
refreshing a coin looses their money if they have more than one
dishonet commitment. They have a $1 \over \kappa$ chance of their
dishonest commitment being selected for the refresh.
\end{proof}
We say a coin is {\em controlled} by a user if the user's wallet knows
@ -1433,6 +1439,8 @@ for the residual value on $C'$ and runs the linking protocol to
determine if it was refreshed too.
\end{proof}
At a result, there is no way for a user to loose control over a coin,
\section{Privacy arguments}