add citation to cryptonote, fix Jeff's typos, cut down politics, reduce verbosity, address some of the fixmes
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@ -70,6 +70,16 @@
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pages = {581--583},
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}
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@unpublished{cryptonote,
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author = {van Saberhagen, Nicolas},
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month = oct,
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posted-at = {2016-09-18 11:44:05},
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priority = {2},
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title = {{CryptoNote v 2.0}},
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url = {https://cryptonote.org/whitepaper.pdf},
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year = {2013}
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}
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@inproceedings{chaum1990untraceable,
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title={Untraceable electronic cash},
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author={Chaum, David and Fiat, Amos and Naor, Moni},
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@ -265,6 +275,3 @@
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doi_url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-44598-6_14",
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url="https://www.iacr.org/archive/crypto2000/18800229/18800229.pdf"
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}
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@ -115,39 +115,38 @@ bank transactions such as SWIFT. These systems enable mass surveillance
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by both governments and private companies. Aspects of this surveillance
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sometimes benefit society by providing information about tax evasion or
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crimes like extortion.
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% FIXME: reads too much like political propaganda
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In particular, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who can
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afford to escape the dragnet.
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%
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%In particular, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who can
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%afford to escape the dragnet.
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%
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At the other extreme, weaker developing nation states have economic
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activity based largely on coins, paper money or even barter. Here,
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the state is often unable to effectively monitor or tax economic
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activity, and this limits the ability of the state to shape the
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society. As bribery is virtually impossible to detect, corruption is
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widespread and not limited to social elites.
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society.
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% If we remove the sentence above, this one also needs to go as it
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% is the dual...
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% As bribery is virtually impossible to detect, corruption is
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% widespread and not limited to social elites.
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%
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%
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% SHORTER: Zerocash need not be mentioned so early?
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% Zerocash~\cite{zerocash} is an example for translating an
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% anarchistic economy into the digital realm.
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This paper describes Taler, a simple and practical payment system for
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a social-liberal society, which is underserved by
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current payment systems.
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This paper describes Taler, a simple and practical payment system
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which balances accountability and privacy.
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The Taler protocol is influenced by ideas from
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} and also follows Chaum's basic
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The Taler protocol is an improvement over Chaum's original
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design~\cite{chaum1983blind} and also follows Chaum's basic
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architecture of customer, merchant and exchange
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}).
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% FIXME: Our design is an improvement on top of Chaums stuff,
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% this reads like it's completely new, which makes it sound
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% too much like marketing for an academic paper
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The two designs share the key first step
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}). The two designs share the key first step
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where the {\em customer} withdraws digital {\em coins} from the {\em
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exchange} with unlinkability provided via blind signatures. The
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coins can then be spent at a {\em merchant} who {\em deposits} them at
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the exchange. Taler uses online detection of double-spending and
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provides exculpability via cryptographic proofs. Thus merchants are
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instantly assured that a transaction is valid.
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provides fair exchange and exculpability via cryptographic proofs.
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% Thus merchants are instantly assured that a transaction is valid.
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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@ -204,8 +203,7 @@ ledgers, have gained immense popularity. The most well-known protocol
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in this class is Bitcoin~\cite{nakamoto2008bitcoin}. An initial
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concern with Bitcoin was the lack of anonymity, as all Bitcoin
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transactions are recorded for eternity, which can enable
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identification of users. In theory, this concern has been addressed
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in the alternative Zerocash protocol~\cite{zerocash}.
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identification of users.
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The key contribution of blockchain-based protocols is that
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they dispense with the need for a central, trusted
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@ -218,7 +216,6 @@ Yet, there are several major irredeemable problems inherent in their designs:
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So Bitcoin is an environmentally irresponsible design.
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\item Bitcoin transactions have pseduononymous recipients, making taxation
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hard to systematically enforce.
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The Zerocash extension makes this worse.
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\item Bitcoin introduces a new currency, creating additional
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financial risks from currency fluctuation.
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\item Anyone can start an alternative Bitcoin transaction chain,
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@ -233,15 +230,11 @@ Yet, there are several major irredeemable problems inherent in their designs:
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% currency exchange and exacerbates the problems with currency fluctuations.
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\end{itemize}
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Anonymous alternatives to BitCoin such as Monero~\cite{??},
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Zerocash~\cite{zerocash}, its predecessor Zerocoin~\cite{miers2013zerocoin},
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and the recently proposed BOLT~\cite{BOLT} each have different technical
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limitations. Yet, all exacerbate BitCoin's inherent issues with
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transaction certenty and performance by require excessive
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computation, more blockchain transactions, etc. By comparison,
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Taler's refresh protocol handles aborted transactions with minimal
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overhead, and ensures that aborts cannot be used to attack the
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privacy assurances of the system.
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Anonymous payment systems based on BitCoin such as
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CryptoNote~\cite{cryptonote} (aka Monero) and Zerocash~\cite{zerocash} (aka
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ZCash) exacerbate these issues. These systems mainly exploit the
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blockchain's decentralized nature to escape anti-money laundering
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regulation as they provide anonymous, disintermediated transactions.
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%GreenCoinX\footnote{\url{https://www.greencoinx.com/}} is a more
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%recent AltCoin where the company promises to identify the owner of
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@ -290,6 +283,13 @@ include:
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% a larger market.
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\end{itemize}
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To our knowledge, the only publicly available effort to implement
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Chaum's idea is Opencoin~\cite{dent2008extensions}. However, Opencoin
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is neither actively developed nor used, and it is not clear
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to what degree the implementation is even complete. Only a partial
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description of the Opencoin protocol is available to date.
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% FIXME: ask OpenCoin dev's about this! Then make statement firmer!
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Chaum's original digital cash system~\cite{chaum1983blind} was
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extended by Brands~\cite{brands1993efficient} with the ability to {\em
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divide} coins and thus spend certain fractions of a coin using
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@ -311,47 +311,49 @@ rather expensive.
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In pure blind signature based schemes like Taler, withdrawal and spend
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operations require bandwidth logarithmic in the value being withdrawn
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or spent. In \cite{Camenisch05compacte-cash}, there is a zero-knoledge
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or spent. In~\cite{Camenisch05compacte-cash}, there is a zero-knoledge
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scheme that improves upon this, requiring only constant bandwidth for
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withdrawals and spend operations, but unfortunately the exchanges' storage and
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search costs become linear in the total value of all transactions.
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In principle, one could correct this by adding multiple denominations,
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an open problem stated already in \cite{Camenisch05compacte-cash}.
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%In principle, one could correct this by adding multiple denominations,
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%an open problem stated already in~\cite{Camenisch05compacte-cash}.
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% NO: he cannot give change, so that does not really work!
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As described, the scheme employs offline double spending protection,
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which inherently makes it fragile and create an wholey unneccasry
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deanonymization risk. We believe the offline protection from double
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spending could be removed, thus switching the scheme to only protection
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against online doulbe spending, like Taler.
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which inherently makes it fragile and creates an unneccessary
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deanonymization risk.
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%We believe the offline protection from double
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%spending could be removed, thus switching the scheme to only protection
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%against online doulbe spending, like Taler.
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% TOO much detail...
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% FIXME: this doesn't belong in an introduction
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% -- it's in related work, I see no problem. -CG
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% FIXME: also mention the practical divisible ecash stuff
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% FIXME: mention storage costs and computation cost for exchange (still 2^n for 2^n coins)
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% and customer (has to do ZKPs)
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Along with fixing these two issues, an interesting applied research project
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would be to add partial spending and a form of Taler's refresh protocol.
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At present, we feel these relatively new cryptographic techniques incur
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unacceptable financial risks to the exchange, due to underdeveloped
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implementation practice.
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% -- eh, he says ``storage and search costs become linear''.
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%
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%Along with fixing these two issues, an interesting applied research project
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%would be to add partial spending and a form of Taler's refresh protocol.
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%At present, we feel these relatively new cryptographic techniques incur
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%unacceptable financial risks to the exchange, due to underdeveloped
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%implementation practice.
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%
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% SHORTER: Maybe some of the abbove could be thinned since
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% they do not know much about Taler's refresh protcol yet.
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% -- yeah, in particular the feeling/speculative parts are not needed...
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In this vein, there are pure also zero-knoledge proof based schemes
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like \cite{ST99}, and subsequently Zerocash~\cite{zerocash}, and maybe
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varations on BOLT~\cite{BOLT}, that avoid using any denomination-like
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constructs, slightly reducing metadata leakage. At present, these all
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incur excessive bandwidth or computational costs however.
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%In this vein, there are pure also zero-knoledge proof based schemes
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%like~\cite{ST99}, and subsequently Zerocash~\cite{zerocash}, and maybe
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%varations on BOLT~\cite{BOLT}, that avoid using any denomination-like
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%constructs, slightly reducing metadata leakage. At present, these all
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%incur excessive bandwidth or computational costs however.
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% -- commented out, seems excessive.
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%Some argue that the focus on technically perfect but overwhelmingly
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%complex protocols, as well as the the lack of usable, practical
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%solutions lead to an abandonment of these ideas by
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%practitioners~\cite{selby2004analyzing}.
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% FIXME: Move to top of section?
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% FIXME: ask OpenCoin dev's about this! Then make statement firmer!
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To our knowledge, the only publicly available effort to implement
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Chaum's idea is Opencoin~\cite{dent2008extensions}. However, Opencoin
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is neither actively developed nor used, and it is not clear
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to what degree the implementation is even complete. Only a partial
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description of the Opencoin protocol is available to date.
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% FIXME: If we ever add peppercoin stuff, cite Matt Green paper
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