fixing typoes with patch from Luis Ressel
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@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ believe needs a payment system with the following properties:
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signatures should be used extensively in order to be able to
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signatures should be used extensively in order to be able to
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resolve disputes between the involved parties. Nevertheless,
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resolve disputes between the involved parties. Nevertheless,
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customers must never be able to defraud anyone, and merchants must
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customers must never be able to defraud anyone, and merchants must
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at best be able to defraud their customers by not delivering the
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at best be able to defraud their customers by not delivering
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on the agreed contract. Neither merchants nor customers must ever
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on the agreed contract. Neither merchants nor customers must ever
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be able to commit fraud against the mint. Both customers and
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be able to commit fraud against the mint. Both customers and
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merchants must receive cryptographic proofs of bad behavior in
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merchants must receive cryptographic proofs of bad behavior in
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@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ The mint is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to forward them
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when receiving the respective deposit instructions from the merchants.
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when receiving the respective deposit instructions from the merchants.
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Customer and merchant can have some assurances about the mint's
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Customer and merchant can have some assurances about the mint's
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liquidity and operation, as the mint has proven reserves, is subject
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liquidity and operation, as the mint has proven reserves, is subject
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to the law, and can have its business is regularly audited (for
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to the law, and can have its business regularly audited (for
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example, by the government or a trusted third party auditor).
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example, by the government or a trusted third party auditor).
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Regular audits of the mint's accounts must reveal any possible fraud
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Regular audits of the mint's accounts must reveal any possible fraud
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before the mint is allowed to destroy the corresponding accumulated
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before the mint is allowed to destroy the corresponding accumulated
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@ -713,11 +713,11 @@ withdraw funds, those can also be used with Taler.
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A customer can spend coins at a merchant, under the condition that the
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A customer can spend coins at a merchant, under the condition that the
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merchant trusts the specific mint that minted the coin. Merchants are
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merchant trusts the specific mint that minted the coin. Merchants are
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identified by their key $M := (m_s, M_p)$ where the public key $M_p$
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identified by their key $M := (m_s, M_p)$ where the public key $M_p$
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must be known to the customer apriori.
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must be known to the customer a priori.
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The following steps describe the protocol between customer, merchant and mint
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The following steps describe the protocol between customer, merchant and mint
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for a transaction involving a coin $C := (c_s, C_p)$, which was previously signed
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for a transaction involving a coin $C := (c_s, C_p)$, which was previously signed
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by a mint's denomination key $K$, i.e. the customer posses
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by a mint's denomination key $K$, i.e. the customer possesses
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$\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$:
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$\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$:
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\begin{enumerate}
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\begin{enumerate}
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@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ $\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$:
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or goods the merchant will deliver to the customer, $f$ is the price of the offer,
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or goods the merchant will deliver to the customer, $f$ is the price of the offer,
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and $p$ is the merchant's payment information (e.g. his IBAN number) and $r$ is
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and $p$ is the merchant's payment information (e.g. his IBAN number) and $r$ is
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a random nounce. The merchant commits $\langle \mathcal{A}
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a random nounce. The merchant commits $\langle \mathcal{A}
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\rangle$ to disk and sends $\mathcal{A}$ it to the customer.
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\rangle$ to disk and sends $\mathcal{A}$ to the customer.
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\item\label{deposit} The customer must possess or acquire a coin minted by a mint that is
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\item\label{deposit} The customer must possess or acquire a coin minted by a mint that is
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accepted by the merchant, i.e. $K$ should be publicly signed by some $D_j
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accepted by the merchant, i.e. $K$ should be publicly signed by some $D_j
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\in \{D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n\}$, and has a value $\geq f$. (The customer
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\in \{D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n\}$, and has a value $\geq f$. (The customer
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@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ execute the coin refreshing protocol with the mint.
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The following refreshing protocol is executed in order to melt a dirty
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The following refreshing protocol is executed in order to melt a dirty
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coin $C'$ of denomination $K$ to obtain a fresh coin $\widetilde{C}$
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coin $C'$ of denomination $K$ to obtain a fresh coin $\widetilde{C}$
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with the same denomination. In pratice, Taler uses a natural
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with the same denomination. In practice, Taler uses a natural
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extension where multiple fresh coins are generated a the same time to
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extension where multiple fresh coins are generated a the same time to
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enable giving precise change matching any amount. In the
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enable giving precise change matching any amount. In the
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protocol, $\kappa \ge 3$ is a security parameter and $G$ is the
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protocol, $\kappa \ge 3$ is a security parameter and $G$ is the
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