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fixing typoes with patch from Luis Ressel

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This commit is contained in:
Christian Grothoff 2015-09-28 15:33:09 +02:00
parent da04a98358
commit c4fd43dd0c
1 changed files with 6 additions and 6 deletions
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doc/paper/taler.tex
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@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ believe needs a payment system with the following properties:
signatures should be used extensively in order to be able to
resolve disputes between the involved parties. Nevertheless,
customers must never be able to defraud anyone, and merchants must
at best be able to defraud their customers by not delivering the
at best be able to defraud their customers by not delivering
on the agreed contract. Neither merchants nor customers must ever
be able to commit fraud against the mint. Both customers and
merchants must receive cryptographic proofs of bad behavior in
@ -400,7 +400,7 @@ The mint is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to forward them
when receiving the respective deposit instructions from the merchants.
Customer and merchant can have some assurances about the mint's
liquidity and operation, as the mint has proven reserves, is subject
to the law, and can have its business is regularly audited (for
to the law, and can have its business regularly audited (for
example, by the government or a trusted third party auditor).
Regular audits of the mint's accounts must reveal any possible fraud
before the mint is allowed to destroy the corresponding accumulated
@ -713,11 +713,11 @@ withdraw funds, those can also be used with Taler.
A customer can spend coins at a merchant, under the condition that the
merchant trusts the specific mint that minted the coin. Merchants are
identified by their key $M := (m_s, M_p)$ where the public key $M_p$
must be known to the customer apriori.
must be known to the customer a priori.
The following steps describe the protocol between customer, merchant and mint
for a transaction involving a coin $C := (c_s, C_p)$, which was previously signed
by a mint's denomination key $K$, i.e. the customer posses
by a mint's denomination key $K$, i.e. the customer possesses
$\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$:
\begin{enumerate}
@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ $\widetilde{C} := S_K(C_p)$:
or goods the merchant will deliver to the customer, $f$ is the price of the offer,
and $p$ is the merchant's payment information (e.g. his IBAN number) and $r$ is
a random nounce. The merchant commits $\langle \mathcal{A}
\rangle$ to disk and sends $\mathcal{A}$ it to the customer.
\rangle$ to disk and sends $\mathcal{A}$ to the customer.
\item\label{deposit} The customer must possess or acquire a coin minted by a mint that is
accepted by the merchant, i.e. $K$ should be publicly signed by some $D_j
\in \{D_1, D_2, \ldots, D_n\}$, and has a value $\geq f$. (The customer
@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ execute the coin refreshing protocol with the mint.
The following refreshing protocol is executed in order to melt a dirty
coin $C'$ of denomination $K$ to obtain a fresh coin $\widetilde{C}$
with the same denomination. In pratice, Taler uses a natural
with the same denomination. In practice, Taler uses a natural
extension where multiple fresh coins are generated a the same time to
enable giving precise change matching any amount. In the
protocol, $\kappa \ge 3$ is a security parameter and $G$ is the