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take insertion into known_coins outside of main melt transaction to reduce conflict potential

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This commit is contained in:
Christian Grothoff 2021-12-05 18:14:48 +01:00
parent 19de0f604f
commit bb6c11ad9e
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GPG Key ID: 939E6BE1E29FC3CC
2 changed files with 35 additions and 19 deletions
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3
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_db.c
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@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ TEH_make_coin_known (const struct TALER_CoinPublicInfo *coin,
NULL);
return qs;
}
// FIXME: why do we even return the transaction
// history here!? This is a coin with multiple
// associated denominations, after all...
*mhd_ret
= TEH_RESPONSE_reply_coin_insufficient_funds (
connection,

51
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_melt.c
View File

@ -311,16 +311,6 @@ melt_transaction (void *cls,
enum GNUNET_DB_QueryStatus qs;
uint32_t noreveal_index;
/* First, make sure coin is 'known' in database */
if (! rmc->coin_is_dirty)
{
qs = TEH_make_coin_known (&rmc->refresh_session.coin,
connection,
mhd_ret);
if (qs < 0)
return qs;
}
/* Check if we already created a matching refresh_session */
qs = TEH_plugin->get_melt_index (TEH_plugin->cls,
&rmc->refresh_session.rc,
@ -420,7 +410,22 @@ handle_melt (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
}
}
/* run database transaction */
/* first, make sure coin is known */
if (! rmc->coin_is_dirty)
{
MHD_RESULT mhd_ret = MHD_NO;
enum GNUNET_DB_QueryStatus qs;
qs = TEH_make_coin_known (&rmc->refresh_session.coin,
connection,
&mhd_ret);
/* no transaction => no serialization failures should be possible */
GNUNET_break (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SOFT_ERROR != qs);
if (qs < 0)
return mhd_ret;
}
/* run main database transaction */
{
MHD_RESULT mhd_ret;
@ -513,10 +518,6 @@ check_for_denomination_key (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
TALER_EC_GENERIC_DB_FETCH_FAILED,
"coin denomination");
}
/* sanity check */
GNUNET_break (0 ==
GNUNET_memcmp (&denom_hash,
&rmc->refresh_session.coin.denom_pub_hash));
if (GNUNET_DB_STATUS_SUCCESS_ONE_RESULT != qs)
{
struct GNUNET_TIME_Absolute now;
@ -531,11 +532,23 @@ check_for_denomination_key (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
TALER_EC_EXCHANGE_GENERIC_DENOMINATION_EXPIRED,
"MELT");
}
else
/* Minor optimization: no need to run the
"ensure_coin_known" part of the transaction */
rmc->coin_is_dirty = true;
/* sanity check */
if (0 !=
GNUNET_memcmp (&denom_hash,
&rmc->refresh_session.coin.denom_pub_hash))
{
/* Minor optimization: no need to run the
"ensure_coin_known" part of the transaction */
rmc->coin_is_dirty = true;
GNUNET_break_op (0);
// => this is probably the wrong call, as this
// is NOT about insufficient funds!
// (see also taler-exchange-httpd_db.c for an equivalent issue)
return TEH_RESPONSE_reply_coin_insufficient_funds (
connection,
TALER_EC_EXCHANGE_GENERIC_COIN_CONFLICTING_DENOMINATION_KEY,
&rmc->refresh_session.coin.coin_pub,
NULL);
}
rmc->zombie_required = true; /* check later that zombie is satisfied */
}