Changes to first two sections based on referee reports
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@ -88,19 +88,24 @@ citizen's needs for private economic activity.
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\section{Introduction}
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\section{Introduction}
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The design of payment systems shapes economies and societies. Strong,
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The design of payment systems shapes economies and societies.
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developed nation states are evolving towards fully transparent payment
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Strong, developed nation states are evolving towards transparent
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systems, such as the MasterCard and VisaCard credit card schemes and
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payment systems, such as the MasterCard and VisaCard credit card
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computerized bank transactions such as SWIFT. Such systems enable
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schemes and computerized bank transactions such as SWIFT.
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mass surveillance and thus extensive government control over the
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economy, from taxation to intrusion into private lives. Bribery and
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These systems enable mass surveillance by both governments and
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corruption are limited to elites that can afford to escape the
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private companies, chilling customer activity \cite{???}.
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dragnet. The other extreme are economies of developing, weak nation
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Aspects of this government control benifit the economy, by enabling
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states where economic activity is based largely on coins, paper money
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taxation. Also, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who
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or even barter. Here, the state is often unable to effectively
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can afford to escape the dragnet.
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monitor or tax economic activity, and this limits the ability of the
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state to shape the society. As bribery is virtually impossible to
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At the other extreme, weaker developing nation states have economic
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detect, corruption is widespread and not limited to social elites.
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activity based largely on coins, paper money or even barter.
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Here, the state is often unable to effectively monitor or tax economic
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activity, and this limits the ability of the state to shape the society.
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As bribery is virtually impossible to detect, corruption is widespread
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and not limited to social elites.
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%
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ZeroCoin~\cite{miers2013zerocoin} is an example for translating such
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ZeroCoin~\cite{miers2013zerocoin} is an example for translating such
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an economy into the digital realm.
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an economy into the digital realm.
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% FIXME: Unclear referee comment :
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% FIXME: Unclear referee comment :
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@ -115,13 +120,14 @@ anarchistic economies.
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The Taler protocol is heavily based on ideas from
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The Taler protocol is heavily based on ideas from
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} and also follows Chaum's basic architecture of
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} and also follows Chaum's basic architecture of
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customer, merchant and exchange (Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}). The two designs
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customer, merchant and exchange (Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}),
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share the key first step where the {\em customer} withdraws digital
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which Chaum termed the mint.
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{\em coins} from the {\em exchange} with unlinkability provided via blind
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The two designs share the key first step where the {\em customer}
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signatures. The coins can then be spent at a {\em merchant} who {\em
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withdraws digital {\em coins} from the {\em exchange} with unlinkability
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deposits} them at the exchange. Taler uses online detection of
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provided via blind signatures. The coins can then be spent at a
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double-spending, thus assuring the merchant instantly that a
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{\em merchant} who {\em deposits} them at the exchange.
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transaction is valid.
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Taler uses online detection of double-spending, thus assuring the merchant
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instantly that a transaction is valid.
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\begin{figure}[h]
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\centering
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\centering
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@ -158,8 +164,8 @@ believe needs a payment system with the following properties:
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%, even when taking aborted transactions into account.
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%, even when taking aborted transactions into account.
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\item[Taxability]
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\item[Taxability]
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In many current legal systems, it is the responsibility of the merchant
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In many current legal systems, it is the responsibility of the merchant
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to deduct (sales) taxes from purchases made by customers, or for workers
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to deduct sales taxes from purchases made by customers, or for workers
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to pay (income) taxes for payments received for work.
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to pay income taxes for payments received for work.
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%Taxation is necessary for the state to
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%Taxation is necessary for the state to
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%provide legitimate social functions, such as education. Thus, a payment
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%provide legitimate social functions, such as education. Thus, a payment
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%system must facilitate sales, income and transaction taxes.
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%system must facilitate sales, income and transaction taxes.
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@ -173,23 +179,24 @@ believe needs a payment system with the following properties:
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Nevertheless, customers must never be able to defraud anyone, and
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Nevertheless, customers must never be able to defraud anyone, and
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merchants must at best be able to defraud their customers by not
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merchants must at best be able to defraud their customers by not
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delivering on the agreed contract. Neither merchants nor customers
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delivering on the agreed contract. Neither merchants nor customers
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should ever be able to commit fraud against the exchange. Additionally,
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should ever be able to commit fraud against the exchange.
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both customers and merchants must receive cryptographic proofs of
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In addition, both customers and merchants should receive cryptographic
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bad behavior in case of protocol violations by the exchange.
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proofs of bad behavior in case of protocol violations by the exchange.
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In this way, only the exchange will need to be tightly audited and regulated.
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In this way, only the exchange needs be tightly audited and regulated.
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The design must make it easy to audit the finances of the exchange.
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The design must make it easy to audit the finances of the exchange.
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\item[Ease of Deployment] %The system should be easy to deploy for
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% \item[Ease of Deployment] %The system should be easy to deploy for
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% real-world applications. In order to lower the entry barrier and
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% real-world applications. In order to lower the entry barrier and
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% acceptance of the system, a gateway to the existing financial
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% acceptance of the system, a gateway to the existing financial
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% system should be provided, i.e. by integrating internet-banking
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% system should be provided, i.e. by integrating internet-banking
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% protocols such as HBCI/FinTAN.
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% protocols such as HBCI/FinTAN.
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% The protocol should
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% be able to run easily over HTTP(S).
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\item[No speculation] % It's actually "Specualtion not required"
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The digital coins should be denominated in existing currencies,
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The digital coins should be denominated in existing currencies,
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such as EUR or USD, to avoid exposing citizens to unnecessary risks
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such as EUR or USD, to avoid exposing citizens to unnecessary risks
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from currency fluctuations.
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from currency fluctuations.
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Moreover, the system must have an open protocol specification and
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Moreover, the system must have an open protocol specification and
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a free software reference implementation.
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a free software reference implementation.
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% The protocol should
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% be able to run easily over HTTP(S).
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\item[Low resource consumption]
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\item[Low resource consumption]
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In order to minimize the operating costs and environmental impact of
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In order to minimize the operating costs and environmental impact of
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the payment system, it should avoid the reliance on expensive or
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the payment system, it should avoid the reliance on expensive or
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@ -208,11 +215,9 @@ the system must thus support giving change in the form of spendable coins,
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say a \EUR{0,01} coin and a \EUR{50,00} coin.
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say a \EUR{0,01} coin and a \EUR{50,00} coin.
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A merchant cannot simply give the customer their coins in another transaction;
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A merchant cannot simply give the customer their coins in another transaction;
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however, as this reverses the role of merchant and customer, and
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however, as this reverses the role of merchant and customer, and
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our taxability requirement would deanonymize the customer. The customer
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our taxability requirement would deanonymize the customer.
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also cannot withdraw exact change from his account from the exchange, as this
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Also, the customer cannot withdraw exact change from his account with
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would allow the exchange to link the identity of the customer that is revealed
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the exchange, as doing so deanonymizes her through a corrolation attack.
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during withdrawal to the subsequent deposit operation that follows shortly
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afterwards.
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Instead, the customer should obtain new freshly anonymized coins that cannot be
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Instead, the customer should obtain new freshly anonymized coins that cannot be
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linked with this transaction, the original \EUR{100,00} coin, or each other.
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linked with this transaction, the original \EUR{100,00} coin, or each other.
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@ -243,7 +248,7 @@ As with support for fractional payments, Taler addresses these problems by
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allowing customers to refresh tainted coins, thereby destroying the link
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allowing customers to refresh tainted coins, thereby destroying the link
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between the refunded or aborted transaction and the new coin.
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between the refunded or aborted transaction and the new coin.
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Taler ensures that the {\em entity} of the user owning the new coin is
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Taler ensures that the {\em entity} owning the new coin is
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the same as the entity of the user owning the old coin, thus making
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the same as the entity of the user owning the old coin, thus making
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sure that the refreshing protocol cannot be abused for money
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sure that the refreshing protocol cannot be abused for money
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laundering or other illicit transactions.
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laundering or other illicit transactions.
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@ -269,16 +274,16 @@ Yet, there are several major irredeemable problems inherent in their designs:
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\begin{itemize}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item The computational puzzles solved by Bitcoin nodes with the purpose
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\item The computational puzzles solved by Bitcoin nodes with the purpose
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of securing the block chain consume a considerable amount of computational
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of securing the block chain consume a considerable amount of computational
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resources and energy. So Bitcoin does not an environmentally responsible
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resources and energy. So Bitcoin is not an environmentally responsible
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design.
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design.
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\item Bitcoin transactions have pseduononymous recipients, making taxation
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\item Bitcoin transactions have pseduononymous recipients, making taxation
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problematic, and leading to legal hurdles.
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problematic, and leading to legal hurdles.
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The Zerocoin extension would only make this worse.
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The Zerocoin extension would only make this worse.
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\item Bitcoins can not easily be bound to any fiat currency, leading to
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\item Bitcoin seemingly requires speculation to offset the mining cost,
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significant fluctuations in value. These fluctuations may be desirable in
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creating fluctuations in value, and making it hard to bind to national
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a high-risk investment instrument, but they make Bitcoin unsuitable as
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currencies. These fluctuations may be desirable in a high-risk investment
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a medium of exchange.
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instrument, but they make Bitcoin unsuitable as a medium of exchange.
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\item Worse, anyone can start an alternative Bitcoin transaction chain,
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\item Anyone can start an alternative Bitcoin transaction chain,
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called an AltCoin, and, if successful, reap the benefits of the low
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called an AltCoin, and, if successful, reap the benefits of the low
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cost to initially create coins via computation. As participants are
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cost to initially create coins via computation. As participants are
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de facto investors, these become a form of ponzi scheme.
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de facto investors, these become a form of ponzi scheme.
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@ -310,13 +315,15 @@ Taler avoids include:
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\begin{itemize}
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\begin{itemize}
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\item The use of patents to protect the technology; a payment system
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\item The use of patents to protect the technology; a payment system
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should be free software (libre) to have a chance for widespread adoption.
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should be free software (libre) to have a chance for widespread adoption.
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\item The use of off-line payments and thus deferred detection of
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\item Support for payments to off-line merchants, and thus deferred
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double-spending, which could require the exchange to attempt to recover
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detection of double-spending, requires the exchange to attempt to
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funds from customers via the legal system. This creates a
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recover funds from delinquent customers via the legal system.
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significant business risk for the exchange, as the system is not
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Any system like this that fails to be self-enforcing creates a major
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self-enforcing from the perspective of the exchange. In 1983 off-line
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business risk for the exchange. In 1983, there were merchants without
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payments might have been a necessary feature. However, today
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network connectivity
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requiring network connectivity is feasible and avoids the business
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need to have
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been a necessary feature.
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However, today requiring network connectivity is feasible and avoids the business
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risks associated with deferred fraud detection.
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risks associated with deferred fraud detection.
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\item % In addition to the risk of legal disputes with fraudulent
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\item % In addition to the risk of legal disputes with fraudulent
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% merchants and customers,
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% merchants and customers,
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