taler/exchange
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Update Security model section

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Jeff Burdges 2016-10-28 17:58:55 +02:00
parent 47e1f528b8
commit 78d315d76a
1 changed files with 44 additions and 24 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

68
doc/paper/taler.tex
View File

@ -337,37 +337,57 @@ assures customers and merchants that the exchange operates correctly.
\subsection{Security model} \subsection{Security model}
Taler's security model assumes that cryptographic primitives are Taler assumes that each participant has full control over their system.
secure and that each participant is under full control of his system. In particular, cloud operator create an intractable insider threat.
% FIXME: Jeff, can you concisely state the precise assumpitons?
% (i.e. hardness of EC-DLOG for refresh, RSA assumption, hash collision resistance (?))
The contact information of the exchange is known to both customer and
merchant from the start. We further assume that the customer can
authenticate the merchant, e.g. using X.509
certificates~\cite{rfc6818}. Finally, we assume that customer has an
anonymous bi-directional channel, such as Tor, to communicate with
both the exchange and the merchant.
The exchange is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to forward We assume the contact information of the exchange is known to
them when receiving the respective deposit instructions from the both customer and merchant from the start. We further assume that
merchants. Customer and merchant can have assurances about the the customer can authenticate the merchant, such as by using X.509
certificates~\cite{rfc6818}.
A Taler exchange is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to
forward them when receiving the respective deposit instructions from
the merchants. Customer and merchant can have assurances about the
exchange's liquidity and operation though published audits by exchange's liquidity and operation though published audits by
financial regulators or other trusted third parties. financial regulators or other trusted third parties.
Online signing keys expire regularly, allowing the exchange to
eventually destroy the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs.
The merchant is trusted to deliver the service or goods to the We reiterate that an exchange must secure both its keys, especially
its denomination key, and its databases of customer reserve accounts
and of spent coins. An exchange's denomination signing keys do
expire regularly though, allowing the exchange to eventually destroy
the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs, and limiting the
exchange's financial liabiltiy in the case of insider attacks.
On the cryptohgraphic side, a Taler exchange demands that coins use a
full domain hash (FDH) to make so-called ``one-more forgery'' attacks
provably hard, assuming the RSA known-target inversion problem is
hard~\cite[Theorem 12]{RSA-HDF-KTIvCTI}.
A Taler merchant is trusted to deliver the service or goods to the
customer upon receiving payment. The customer can seek legal relief customer upon receiving payment. The customer can seek legal relief
to achieve this, as he receives cryptographic proofs of the contract to achieve this, as he receives cryptographic proofs of the contract
and has proof that he paid his obligations. and has proof that he paid his obligations.
Neither the merchant nor the customer have any ability to {\em effectively} All combined, there are phesable methods for merchants and customers
defraud the exchange or the state collecting taxes. Here, ``effectively'' to defraud the exchange, without insider access. There are no effective
means that the expected return for fraud is negative. methods for merchants and customers to conceal a merchants income,
% thereby enabling extortion or defrauding tax collectors, assuming that
%Note that customers do not need to be trusted in any way, and that in the maximum tax rate is below $1/\kappa$ and that
%particular it is never necessary for anyone to try to recover funds the customer is unwilling to pay $\kappa$ times the price.
%from customers using legal coersion.
\smallskip
We assume each Taler customer has an anonymous bi-directional channel,
such as Tor, to communicate with both the exchange and the merchant.
In particular, we note that customers should be anonymous when ther
Taler wallet makes {\tt /keys} requests, which may impose requirements
on the usage of teh anonymous channel.
For a withdrawn coin, we believe violating the customers anonymity
cryptographily requires recognizing a random blinding factor from a
random element of the group of integers modulo the denomination key's
RSA modulus, which appears impossible even with a quantum computers.
For a refreshed coin, unlinkabiltiy requires the hardness of the
discrete logarithm in curve25519.
\subsection{Taxability and Entities} \subsection{Taxability and Entities}