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fix typos

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Florian Dold 2017-05-19 14:25:45 +02:00
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doc/paper/taler.tex
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@ -1354,17 +1354,17 @@ other users.
We will now consider the impact of the refresh operation.
For the sake of the argument, we will first consider an earlier
encryption-based version of the protocol in which a refresh operated
encryption-based version of the protocol in which a refresh operation
consisted of $\kappa$ normal coin withdrawals and the commitment
consisted of the blinding factors and private keys of the fresh coins
encrypted using the secret $t^{(i)} C_s$ where $C_s = c_s G$ of the
dirty coin $C$ being refreshed and $T^{(i)} = t^{(i)} G$ is the
transfer key.
%
In Taler, we replaced this encryption-based schem with the current
KDF-based scheme as it required slightly more storage space, the
additional, encryption primitive, and exposed more random number
generator output from the wallet.
In Taler, we replaced this encryption-based scheme with the current KDF-based
scheme, as the earlier scheme required slightly more storage space, an
additional encryption primitive, and exposed more random number generator
output from the wallet.
\begin{proposition}
Assuming the encryption used is semantically (IND-CPA) secure, and