inline FC reviews/responses in main paper

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Christian Grothoff 2017-05-18 15:05:28 +02:00
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commit 57fef70492
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2 changed files with 13 additions and 2 deletions

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@ -58,7 +58,8 @@
\usetikzlibrary{calc} \usetikzlibrary{calc}
\usepackage{eurosym} \usepackage{eurosym}
\usepackage[T1]{fontenc} \usepackage[T1]{fontenc}
\usepackage{verbatim}
\usepackage[utf8]{inputenc}
% Copyright % Copyright
%\setcopyright{none} %\setcopyright{none}
@ -1868,6 +1869,16 @@ data being persisted are represented in between $\langle\rangle$.
\item[$\overline{C^{(i)}_p}$]{Public coin keys computed from $\overline{c_s^{(i)}}$ by the verifier} \item[$\overline{C^{(i)}_p}$]{Public coin keys computed from $\overline{c_s^{(i)}}$ by the verifier}
\end{description} \end{description}
\newpage
\onecolumn
\section{Supplemental: Reviews and Responses from Financial Cryptography}
\subsection{FC 2016}
\verbatiminput{taler_FC2016.txt}
\subsection{FC 2017}
\verbatiminput{taler_FC2017.txt}
\end{document} \end{document}

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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ be insecure.
> We added a section with proofs > We added a section with proofs
I find two (possible) attacks against the refresh protocol. As the I find two (possible) attacks against the refresh protocol. As the
exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp , the attacker can exchange does not check the validity of the public key Cp', the attacker can
send an arbitrary public key to the exchange that will accept, and obtain a send an arbitrary public key to the exchange that will accept, and obtain a
fresh coin. The attacker can spend partially a coin multiple times via fresh coin. The attacker can spend partially a coin multiple times via
refreshing the coin and obtaining a fresh coin in turn, as the refresh protocol refreshing the coin and obtaining a fresh coin in turn, as the refresh protocol