add reference to zerocash
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@ -97,6 +97,13 @@
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organization={Springer}
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organization={Springer}
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}
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}
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@inproceedings{zerocash,
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author = {Eli Ben-Sasson and Alessandro Chiesa and Christina Garman and Matthew Green and Ian Miers and Eran Tromer and Madars Virza},
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title = {Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin},
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booktitle = {IEEE Symposium on Security \& Privacy},
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year = {2014},
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}
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@inproceedings{miers2013zerocoin,
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@inproceedings{miers2013zerocoin,
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title={Zerocoin: Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin},
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title={Zerocoin: Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin},
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author={Miers, Ian and Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Rubin, Aviel D},
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author={Miers, Ian and Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Rubin, Aviel D},
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@ -204,9 +211,9 @@
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author="Bellare, Mihir and Namprempre, Chanathip and Pointcheval, David and Semanko, Michael",
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author="Bellare, Mihir and Namprempre, Chanathip and Pointcheval, David and Semanko, Michael",
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editor="Syverson, Paul",
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editor="Syverson, Paul",
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chapter="The Power of RSA Inversion Oracles and the Security of Chaum's RSA-Based Blind Signature Scheme",
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chapter="The Power of RSA Inversion Oracles and the Security of Chaum's RSA-Based Blind Signature Scheme",
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title="Financial Cryptography: 5th International Conference, FC 2001 Grand Cayman, British West Indies, February 19--22, 2001 Proceedings",
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title="Financial Cryptography: 5th International Conference",
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year="2002",
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year="2002",
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publisher="Springer Berlin Heidelberg",
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publisher="Springer",
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address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
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address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
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pages="319--338",
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pages="319--338",
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isbn="978-3-540-46088-6",
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isbn="978-3-540-46088-6",
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@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ secure and that each participant is under full control of his system.
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The contact information of the exchange is known to both customer and
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The contact information of the exchange is known to both customer and
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merchant from the start. We further assume that the customer can
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merchant from the start. We further assume that the customer can
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authenticate the merchant, e.g. using X.509
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authenticate the merchant, e.g. using X.509
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certificates~\cite{rfc5280}. Finally, we assume that customer has an
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certificates~\cite{rfc6818}. Finally, we assume that customer has an
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anonymous bi-directional channel, such as Tor, to communicate with
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anonymous bi-directional channel, such as Tor, to communicate with
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both the exchange and the merchant.
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both the exchange and the merchant.
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@ -805,8 +805,9 @@ protocol does not need to provide cryptographic security: If the
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maximum applicable tax is less than $\frac{2}{3}$, then $\kappa = 3$
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maximum applicable tax is less than $\frac{2}{3}$, then $\kappa = 3$
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ensures that cheating results in a negative financial return on
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ensures that cheating results in a negative financial return on
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average as $\kappa - 1$ out of $\kappa$ attempts to hide from taxation
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average as $\kappa - 1$ out of $\kappa$ attempts to hide from taxation
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are detected and penalized by a total loss. This makes the use of
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are detected and penalized by a total loss. This makes our use of
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cut-and-choose practical and efficient in this context.
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cut-and-choose practical and efficient, and in particularly faster
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than the comparable use of zk-SNARKs in ZeroCash~\cite{zerocash}.
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% FIXME: I'm explicit about the rounds in postquantum.tex
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% FIXME: I'm explicit about the rounds in postquantum.tex
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