add reference to zerocash

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Christian Grothoff 2016-10-27 15:25:10 +02:00
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2 changed files with 13 additions and 5 deletions

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@ -97,6 +97,13 @@
organization={Springer} organization={Springer}
} }
@inproceedings{zerocash,
author = {Eli Ben-Sasson and Alessandro Chiesa and Christina Garman and Matthew Green and Ian Miers and Eran Tromer and Madars Virza},
title = {Zerocash: Decentralized Anonymous Payments from Bitcoin},
booktitle = {IEEE Symposium on Security \& Privacy},
year = {2014},
}
@inproceedings{miers2013zerocoin, @inproceedings{miers2013zerocoin,
title={Zerocoin: Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin}, title={Zerocoin: Anonymous distributed e-cash from bitcoin},
author={Miers, Ian and Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Rubin, Aviel D}, author={Miers, Ian and Garman, Christina and Green, Matthew and Rubin, Aviel D},
@ -204,9 +211,9 @@
author="Bellare, Mihir and Namprempre, Chanathip and Pointcheval, David and Semanko, Michael", author="Bellare, Mihir and Namprempre, Chanathip and Pointcheval, David and Semanko, Michael",
editor="Syverson, Paul", editor="Syverson, Paul",
chapter="The Power of RSA Inversion Oracles and the Security of Chaum's RSA-Based Blind Signature Scheme", chapter="The Power of RSA Inversion Oracles and the Security of Chaum's RSA-Based Blind Signature Scheme",
title="Financial Cryptography: 5th International Conference, FC 2001 Grand Cayman, British West Indies, February 19--22, 2001 Proceedings", title="Financial Cryptography: 5th International Conference",
year="2002", year="2002",
publisher="Springer Berlin Heidelberg", publisher="Springer",
address="Berlin, Heidelberg", address="Berlin, Heidelberg",
pages="319--338", pages="319--338",
isbn="978-3-540-46088-6", isbn="978-3-540-46088-6",

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@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ secure and that each participant is under full control of his system.
The contact information of the exchange is known to both customer and The contact information of the exchange is known to both customer and
merchant from the start. We further assume that the customer can merchant from the start. We further assume that the customer can
authenticate the merchant, e.g. using X.509 authenticate the merchant, e.g. using X.509
certificates~\cite{rfc5280}. Finally, we assume that customer has an certificates~\cite{rfc6818}. Finally, we assume that customer has an
anonymous bi-directional channel, such as Tor, to communicate with anonymous bi-directional channel, such as Tor, to communicate with
both the exchange and the merchant. both the exchange and the merchant.
@ -805,8 +805,9 @@ protocol does not need to provide cryptographic security: If the
maximum applicable tax is less than $\frac{2}{3}$, then $\kappa = 3$ maximum applicable tax is less than $\frac{2}{3}$, then $\kappa = 3$
ensures that cheating results in a negative financial return on ensures that cheating results in a negative financial return on
average as $\kappa - 1$ out of $\kappa$ attempts to hide from taxation average as $\kappa - 1$ out of $\kappa$ attempts to hide from taxation
are detected and penalized by a total loss. This makes the use of are detected and penalized by a total loss. This makes our use of
cut-and-choose practical and efficient in this context. cut-and-choose practical and efficient, and in particularly faster
than the comparable use of zk-SNARKs in ZeroCash~\cite{zerocash}.
% FIXME: I'm explicit about the rounds in postquantum.tex % FIXME: I'm explicit about the rounds in postquantum.tex