correcting typos introduced by Jeff, also cutting formulations to make it back to page limits
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@ -175,9 +175,11 @@ Additionally, the refresh protocol ensures that the change is owned by
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the same entity which owned the original coin.
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the same entity which owned the original coin.
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\vspace{-0.3cm}
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\section{Related Work}
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\section{Related Work}
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\vspace{-0.3cm}
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\subsection{Blockchain-based currencies}
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%\subsection{Blockchain-based currencies}
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In recent years, a class of decentralized electronic payment systems,
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In recent years, a class of decentralized electronic payment systems,
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based on collectively recorded and verified append-only public
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based on collectively recorded and verified append-only public
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@ -231,7 +233,7 @@ privacy assurances of the system.
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%would also merely impose a financial panopticon on a BitCoin-style
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%would also merely impose a financial panopticon on a BitCoin-style
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%money supply and transaction model.
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%money supply and transaction model.
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\subsection{Chaum-style electronic cash}
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%\subsection{Chaum-style electronic cash}
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} proposed a digital payment system that
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} proposed a digital payment system that
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would provide some customer anonymity while disclosing the identity of
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would provide some customer anonymity while disclosing the identity of
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@ -319,8 +321,9 @@ description of the Opencoin protocol is available to date.
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%macropayment. It is therefore unclear how Peppercoin would actually
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%macropayment. It is therefore unclear how Peppercoin would actually
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%reduce the computational burden on the exchange.
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%reduce the computational burden on the exchange.
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%\vspace{-0.3cm}
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\section{Design}
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\section{Design}
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%\vspace{-0.3cm}
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The Taler system comprises three principal types of actors
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The Taler system comprises three principal types of actors
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}): The \emph{customer} is interested in receiving
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}): The \emph{customer} is interested in receiving
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@ -335,59 +338,47 @@ deposit digital coins in return for receiving credit at the merchant's
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financial reserve. In addition, Taler includes an \emph{auditor} who
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financial reserve. In addition, Taler includes an \emph{auditor} who
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assures customers and merchants that the exchange operates correctly.
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assures customers and merchants that the exchange operates correctly.
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%\vspace{-0.3cm}
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\subsection{Security model}
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\subsection{Security model}
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%\vspace{-0.3cm}
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Taler assumes that each participant has full control over their system.
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Taler assumes that each participant has full control over their
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In particular, cloud operator create an intractable insider threat.
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system. We assume the contact information of the exchange is known to
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both customer and merchant from the start, including that the customer
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We assume the contact information of the exchange is known to
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can authenticate the merchant, for example by using X.509
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both customer and merchant from the start. We further assume that
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certificates~\cite{rfc6818}. A Taler merchant is trusted to deliver
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the customer can authenticate the merchant, such as by using X.509
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the service or goods to the customer upon receiving payment. The
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certificates~\cite{rfc6818}.
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customer can seek legal relief to achieve this, as the customer
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receives cryptographic evidence of the contract and the associated
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payment. We assume each Taler customer has an anonymous
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bi-directional channel, such as Tor, to communicate with both the
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exchange and the merchant.
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A Taler exchange is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to
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A Taler exchange is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to
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forward them when receiving the respective deposit instructions from
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forward them when receiving the respective deposit instructions from
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the merchants. Customer and merchant can have assurances about the
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the merchants. Customer and merchant can have assurances about the
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exchange's liquidity and operation though published audits by
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exchange's liquidity and operation though published audits by
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financial regulators or other trusted third parties.
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financial regulators or other trusted third parties. An exchange's
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signing keys expire regularly, allowing the exchange to eventually
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destroy the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs, and
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limiting the exchange's financial liability.
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We reiterate that an exchange must secure both its keys, especially
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On the cryptographic side, a Taler exchange demands that coins use a
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its denomination key, and its databases of customer reserve accounts
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and of spent coins. An exchange's denomination signing keys do
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expire regularly though, allowing the exchange to eventually destroy
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the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs, and limiting the
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exchange's financial liabiltiy in the case of insider attacks.
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On the cryptohgraphic side, a Taler exchange demands that coins use a
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full domain hash (FDH) to make so-called ``one-more forgery'' attacks
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full domain hash (FDH) to make so-called ``one-more forgery'' attacks
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provably hard, assuming the RSA known-target inversion problem is
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provably hard, assuming the RSA known-target inversion problem is
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hard~\cite[Theorem 12]{RSA-HDF-KTIvCTI}.
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hard~\cite[Theorem 12]{RSA-HDF-KTIvCTI}. For a withdrawn coin,
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violating the customers anonymity cryptographily requires recognizing
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a random blinding factor from a random element of the group of
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integers modulo the denomination key's RSA modulus, which appears
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impossible even with a quantum computers. For a refreshed coin,
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unlinkabiltiy requires the hardness of the discrete logarithm for
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Curve25519.
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A Taler merchant is trusted to deliver the service or goods to the
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The cut-and-choose protocol prevents merchants and customers from
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customer upon receiving payment. The customer can seek legal relief
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conspiring to conceal a merchants income. We assume that the maximum
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to achieve this, as he receives cryptographic proofs of the contract
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tax rate is below $1/\kappa$, and that expected transaction losses of
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and has proof that he paid his obligations.
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a factor of $\kappa$ for tax evasion are thus unacceptable.
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All combined, there are phesable methods for merchants and customers
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to defraud the exchange, without insider access. There are no effective
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methods for merchants and customers to conceal a merchants income,
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thereby enabling extortion or defrauding tax collectors, assuming that
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the maximum tax rate is below $1/\kappa$ and that
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the customer is unwilling to pay $\kappa$ times the price.
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\smallskip
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We assume each Taler customer has an anonymous bi-directional channel,
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such as Tor, to communicate with both the exchange and the merchant.
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In particular, we note that customers should be anonymous when ther
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Taler wallet makes {\tt /keys} requests, which may impose requirements
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on the usage of teh anonymous channel.
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For a withdrawn coin, we believe violating the customers anonymity
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cryptographily requires recognizing a random blinding factor from a
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random element of the group of integers modulo the denomination key's
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RSA modulus, which appears impossible even with a quantum computers.
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For a refreshed coin, unlinkabiltiy requires the hardness of the
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discrete logarithm in curve25519.
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\subsection{Taxability and Entities}
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\subsection{Taxability and Entities}
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@ -495,12 +486,10 @@ exposes these events as anchors for tax audits on income.
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A \emph{coin} in Taler is a public-private key pair where the private
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A \emph{coin} in Taler is a public-private key pair where the private
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key is only known to the owner of the coin. A coin derives its
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key is only known to the owner of the coin. A coin derives its
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financial value from an RSA signature over a the full domain hash
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financial value from an RSA signature over the FDH
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(FDH) of the coin's public key. An FDH is used so that ``one-more
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of the coin's public key. The exchange has multiple RSA {\em
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forgery'' is provably hard assuming the RSA known-target inversion
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denomination key} pairs available for blind-signing coins of
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problem is hard~\cite[Theorem 12]{RSA-HDF-KTIvCTI}. The exchange has
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different value.
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multiple RSA {\em denomination key} pairs available for blind-signing
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coins of different value.
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Denomination keys have an expiration date, before which any coins
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Denomination keys have an expiration date, before which any coins
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signed with it must be spent or refreshed. This allows the exchange
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signed with it must be spent or refreshed. This allows the exchange
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@ -544,11 +533,11 @@ withdrawal message as proof that the reserve was debited correctly.
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After a coin is issued, the customer is the only entity that knows the
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After a coin is issued, the customer is the only entity that knows the
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private key of the coin, making him the \emph{owner} of the coin. Due
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private key of the coin, making him the \emph{owner} of the coin. Due
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to the use of blind signatures, the exchange does not even learn the
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to the use of blind signatures, the exchange does not learn the
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public key during the withdrawal process. If the private key is
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public key during the withdrawal process. If the private key is
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shared with others, they become co-owners of the coin. Knowledge of
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shared with others, they become co-owners of the coin. Knowledge of
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the private key of the coin and the signature over the coin's public
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the private key of the coin and the signature over the coin's public
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key by an exchange's denomination key enables the owner to spent the
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key by an exchange's denomination key enables spending the
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coin.
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coin.
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