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correcting typos introduced by Jeff, also cutting formulations to make it back to page limits

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Christian Grothoff 2016-10-29 14:24:16 +02:00
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doc/paper/taler.tex
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@ -175,9 +175,11 @@ Additionally, the refresh protocol ensures that the change is owned by
the same entity which owned the original coin.
\vspace{-0.3cm}
\section{Related Work}
\vspace{-0.3cm}
\subsection{Blockchain-based currencies}
%\subsection{Blockchain-based currencies}
In recent years, a class of decentralized electronic payment systems,
based on collectively recorded and verified append-only public
@ -231,7 +233,7 @@ privacy assurances of the system.
%would also merely impose a financial panopticon on a BitCoin-style
%money supply and transaction model.
\subsection{Chaum-style electronic cash}
%\subsection{Chaum-style electronic cash}
Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} proposed a digital payment system that
would provide some customer anonymity while disclosing the identity of
@ -319,8 +321,9 @@ description of the Opencoin protocol is available to date.
%macropayment. It is therefore unclear how Peppercoin would actually
%reduce the computational burden on the exchange.
%\vspace{-0.3cm}
\section{Design}
%\vspace{-0.3cm}
The Taler system comprises three principal types of actors
(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}): The \emph{customer} is interested in receiving
@ -335,59 +338,47 @@ deposit digital coins in return for receiving credit at the merchant's
financial reserve. In addition, Taler includes an \emph{auditor} who
assures customers and merchants that the exchange operates correctly.
%\vspace{-0.3cm}
\subsection{Security model}
%\vspace{-0.3cm}
Taler assumes that each participant has full control over their system.
In particular, cloud operator create an intractable insider threat.
We assume the contact information of the exchange is known to
both customer and merchant from the start. We further assume that
the customer can authenticate the merchant, such as by using X.509
certificates~\cite{rfc6818}.
Taler assumes that each participant has full control over their
system. We assume the contact information of the exchange is known to
both customer and merchant from the start, including that the customer
can authenticate the merchant, for example by using X.509
certificates~\cite{rfc6818}. A Taler merchant is trusted to deliver
the service or goods to the customer upon receiving payment. The
customer can seek legal relief to achieve this, as the customer
receives cryptographic evidence of the contract and the associated
payment. We assume each Taler customer has an anonymous
bi-directional channel, such as Tor, to communicate with both the
exchange and the merchant.
A Taler exchange is trusted to hold funds of its customers and to
forward them when receiving the respective deposit instructions from
the merchants. Customer and merchant can have assurances about the
exchange's liquidity and operation though published audits by
financial regulators or other trusted third parties.
financial regulators or other trusted third parties. An exchange's
signing keys expire regularly, allowing the exchange to eventually
destroy the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs, and
limiting the exchange's financial liability.
We reiterate that an exchange must secure both its keys, especially
its denomination key, and its databases of customer reserve accounts
and of spent coins. An exchange's denomination signing keys do
expire regularly though, allowing the exchange to eventually destroy
the corresponding accumulated cryptographic proofs, and limiting the
exchange's financial liabiltiy in the case of insider attacks.
On the cryptohgraphic side, a Taler exchange demands that coins use a
On the cryptographic side, a Taler exchange demands that coins use a
full domain hash (FDH) to make so-called ``one-more forgery'' attacks
provably hard, assuming the RSA known-target inversion problem is
hard~\cite[Theorem 12]{RSA-HDF-KTIvCTI}.
hard~\cite[Theorem 12]{RSA-HDF-KTIvCTI}. For a withdrawn coin,
violating the customers anonymity cryptographily requires recognizing
a random blinding factor from a random element of the group of
integers modulo the denomination key's RSA modulus, which appears
impossible even with a quantum computers. For a refreshed coin,
unlinkabiltiy requires the hardness of the discrete logarithm for
Curve25519.
A Taler merchant is trusted to deliver the service or goods to the
customer upon receiving payment. The customer can seek legal relief
to achieve this, as he receives cryptographic proofs of the contract
and has proof that he paid his obligations.
The cut-and-choose protocol prevents merchants and customers from
conspiring to conceal a merchants income. We assume that the maximum
tax rate is below $1/\kappa$, and that expected transaction losses of
a factor of $\kappa$ for tax evasion are thus unacceptable.
All combined, there are phesable methods for merchants and customers
to defraud the exchange, without insider access. There are no effective
methods for merchants and customers to conceal a merchants income,
thereby enabling extortion or defrauding tax collectors, assuming that
the maximum tax rate is below $1/\kappa$ and that
the customer is unwilling to pay $\kappa$ times the price.
\smallskip
We assume each Taler customer has an anonymous bi-directional channel,
such as Tor, to communicate with both the exchange and the merchant.
In particular, we note that customers should be anonymous when ther
Taler wallet makes {\tt /keys} requests, which may impose requirements
on the usage of teh anonymous channel.
For a withdrawn coin, we believe violating the customers anonymity
cryptographily requires recognizing a random blinding factor from a
random element of the group of integers modulo the denomination key's
RSA modulus, which appears impossible even with a quantum computers.
For a refreshed coin, unlinkabiltiy requires the hardness of the
discrete logarithm in curve25519.
\subsection{Taxability and Entities}
@ -495,12 +486,10 @@ exposes these events as anchors for tax audits on income.
A \emph{coin} in Taler is a public-private key pair where the private
key is only known to the owner of the coin. A coin derives its
financial value from an RSA signature over a the full domain hash
(FDH) of the coin's public key. An FDH is used so that ``one-more
forgery'' is provably hard assuming the RSA known-target inversion
problem is hard~\cite[Theorem 12]{RSA-HDF-KTIvCTI}. The exchange has
multiple RSA {\em denomination key} pairs available for blind-signing
coins of different value.
financial value from an RSA signature over the FDH
of the coin's public key. The exchange has multiple RSA {\em
denomination key} pairs available for blind-signing coins of
different value.
Denomination keys have an expiration date, before which any coins
signed with it must be spent or refreshed. This allows the exchange
@ -544,11 +533,11 @@ withdrawal message as proof that the reserve was debited correctly.
After a coin is issued, the customer is the only entity that knows the
private key of the coin, making him the \emph{owner} of the coin. Due
to the use of blind signatures, the exchange does not even learn the
to the use of blind signatures, the exchange does not learn the
public key during the withdrawal process. If the private key is
shared with others, they become co-owners of the coin. Knowledge of
the private key of the coin and the signature over the coin's public
key by an exchange's denomination key enables the owner to spent the
key by an exchange's denomination key enables spending the
coin.