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remove bogus warnings

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This commit is contained in:
Christian Grothoff 2020-03-29 04:16:00 +02:00
parent 0582a6b567
commit 2b27d4ca8b
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 939E6BE1E29FC3CC
6 changed files with 11 additions and 14 deletions
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4
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_deposit.c
View File

@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ deposit_transaction (void *cls,
if (0 < TALER_amount_cmp (&spent,
&dc->value))
{
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Deposited coin has insufficient funds left!\n");
*mhd_ret = TEH_RESPONSE_reply_coin_insufficient_funds (connection,
TALER_EC_DEPOSIT_INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS,
@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ TEH_handler_deposit (struct MHD_Connection *connection,
&hc);
if (NULL == dki)
{
TALER_LOG_WARNING ("Unknown denomination key in /deposit request\n");
TALER_LOG_DEBUG ("Unknown denomination key in /deposit request\n");
TEH_KS_release (key_state);
GNUNET_JSON_parse_free (spec);
return TALER_MHD_reply_with_error (connection,

1
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_refund.c
View File

@ -185,7 +185,6 @@ refund_transaction (void *cls,
(tlp->details.refund->rtransaction_id !=
refund->details.rtransaction_id) )
{
GNUNET_break_op (0); /* conflicting refund found */
refund_found = GNUNET_SYSERR;
/* NOTE: Alternatively we could total up all existing
refunds and check if the sum still permits the

3
src/exchange/taler-exchange-httpd_withdraw.c
View File

@ -250,7 +250,6 @@ withdraw_transaction (void *cls,
/* The reserve does not have the required amount (actual
* amount + withdraw fee) */
GNUNET_break_op (0);
#if GNUNET_EXTRA_LOGGING
{
char *amount_required;
@ -258,7 +257,7 @@ withdraw_transaction (void *cls,
amount_required = TALER_amount_to_string (&wc->amount_required);
r_balance = TALER_amount_to_string (&r.balance);
TALER_LOG_WARNING ("Asked %s over a reserve worth %s\n",
TALER_LOG_DEBUG ("Asked %s over a reserve worth %s\n",
amount_required,
r_balance);
GNUNET_free (amount_required);

3
src/lib/exchange_api_handle.c
View File

@ -955,9 +955,6 @@ decode_keys_json (const json_t *resp_obj,
{
/* 0:0:0 did not support /keys cherry picking */
TALER_LOG_DEBUG ("Skipping denomination key: already know it\n");
/* Okay, but why breaking here? It could be that the
* user redownloaded all the keys in a forced way. */
GNUNET_break_op (0 == current);
GNUNET_CRYPTO_rsa_public_key_free (dk.key.rsa_public_key);
continue;
}

4
src/testing/testing_api_cmd_recoup.c
View File

@ -250,6 +250,10 @@ recoup_cb (void *cls,
/* ps->reserve_history.details.recoup_details.coin_pub; // initialized earlier */
}
break;
case MHD_HTTP_NOT_FOUND:
break;
case MHD_HTTP_CONFLICT:
break;
default:
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
"Unmanaged HTTP status code %u.\n",

6
src/testing/testing_api_cmd_status.c
View File

@ -206,10 +206,8 @@ analyze_command (const struct TALER_ReservePublicKeyP *reserve_pub,
0,
&he))
{
/* NOTE: good for debugging for now, might later reduce debug
level in case there are commands that legitimately don't
impact the reserve history but have the public key trait */
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_WARNING,
/* NOTE: only for debugging... */
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
"Command `%s' has the reserve_pub trait, but does not reserve history trait\n",
cmd->label);
return GNUNET_OK; /* command does nothing for reserves */