typos and lots of FIXME/TODO
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@ -74,13 +74,20 @@
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\maketitle
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% FIXME: As a general comment, I think we're mixing the crypto stuff and the systems
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% stuff too much. It might be more appropriate to have to systems stuff in a separate
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% section, and the "pure" crypto stuff for the crypto people?
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\begin{abstract}
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This paper introduces {\em Taler}, a Chaum-style digital payment system that
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enables anonymous payments while ensuring that entities that receive
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payments are auditable. In Taler, customers can
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never defraud anyone, merchants can only fail to deliver the
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merchandise to the customer, and payment service providers can be
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fully audited. All parties receive cryptographic evidence for all
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fully audited.
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% FIXME: above, we're still using auditor
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All parties receive cryptographic evidence for all
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transactions; still, each party only receives the minimum information
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required to execute transactions. Enforcement of honest behavior is
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timely, and is at least as strict as with legacy credit card payment
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@ -108,6 +115,7 @@ bank transactions such as SWIFT. These systems enable mass surveillance
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by both governments and private companies. Aspects of this surveillance
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sometimes benefit society by providing information about tax evasion or
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crimes like extortion.
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% FIXME: reads too much like political propaganda
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In particular, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who can
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afford to escape the dragnet.
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%
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@ -129,7 +137,11 @@ current payment systems.
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The Taler protocol is influenced by ideas from
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Chaum~\cite{chaum1983blind} and also follows Chaum's basic
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architecture of customer, merchant and exchange
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}). The two designs share the key first step
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(Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}).
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% FIXME: Our design is an improvement on top of Chaums stuff,
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% this reads like it's completely new, which makes it sound
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% too much like marketing for an academic paper
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The two designs share the key first step
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where the {\em customer} withdraws digital {\em coins} from the {\em
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exchange} with unlinkability provided via blind signatures. The
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coins can then be spent at a {\em merchant} who {\em deposits} them at
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@ -168,6 +180,8 @@ withdraw exact change from her account, as doing so reduces anonymity
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due to the obvious correlation. A practical payment system must thus
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support giving change.
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% FIXME: make the connection to Camenisch's fair exchange paper here,
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% since refresh solves the same problem in a much more elegant way
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Taler solves the problem of giving change by introducing a new
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{\em refresh protocol}. Using this protocol, a customer can obtain
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change or refunds in the form of fresh coins that other parties cannot
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@ -182,6 +196,8 @@ the same entity which owned the original coin.
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%\subsection{Blockchain-based currencies}
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% FIXME: SHORTEN. This is probably too much information for the audience, they
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% all know this
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In recent years, a class of decentralized electronic payment systems,
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based on collectively recorded and verified append-only public
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ledgers, have gained immense popularity. The most well-known protocol
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@ -297,15 +313,19 @@ In pure blind signature based schemes like Taler, withdrawal and spend
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operations require bandwidth logarithmic in the value being withdrawn
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or spent. In \cite{Camenisch05compacte-cash}, there is a zero-knoledge
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scheme that improves upon this, requiring only constant bandwidth for
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withdrawals and spend operations, but sadly the exchanges' storage and
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search costs become lienar in the total value of all transactions.
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In princile, one could correct this by adding multiple denominations,
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withdrawals and spend operations, but unfortunately the exchanges' storage and
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search costs become linear in the total value of all transactions.
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In principle, one could correct this by adding multiple denominations,
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an open problem stated already in \cite{Camenisch05compacte-cash}.
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As described, the scheme employs offline double spending protection,
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which inherently makes it fragile and create an wholey unneccasry
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deanonymization risk. We believe the offline protection from double
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spending could be removed, thus switching the scheme to only protection
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against online doulbe spending, like Taler.
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% FIXME: this doesn't belong in an introduction
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% FIXME: also mention the practical divisible ecash stuff
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% FIXME: mention storage costs and computation cost for exchange (still 2^n for 2^n coins)
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% and customer (has to do ZKPs)
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Along with fixing these two issues, an interesting applied research project
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would be to add partial spending and a form of Taler's refresh protocol.
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At present, we feel these relatively new cryptographic techniques incur
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@ -334,6 +354,10 @@ to what degree the implementation is even complete. Only a partial
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description of the Opencoin protocol is available to date.
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% FIXME: If we ever add peppercoin stuff, cite Matt Green paper
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% and talk about economics when encoding a punishment-coin
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% as the identity, whith limited ticket lifespan
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%\subsection{Peppercoin}
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%Peppercoin~\cite{rivest2004peppercoin} is a microdonation protocol.
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@ -371,6 +395,7 @@ assures customers and merchants that the exchange operates correctly.
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\subsection{Security model}
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%\vspace{-0.3cm}
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% FIXME: Is this too obvious for a crypto paper?
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Taler assumes that each participant has full control over their
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system. We assume the contact information of the exchange is known to
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both customer and merchant from the start, including that the customer
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@ -403,6 +428,9 @@ impossible even with a quantum computers. For a refreshed coin,
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unlinkabiltiy requires the hardness of the discrete logarithm for
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Curve25519.
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% FIXME: should we cite the policy paper about cryptocurrencies
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% from the 90s near here?
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The cut-and-choose protocol prevents merchants and customers from
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conspiring to conceal a merchants income. We assume that the maximum
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tax rate is below $1/\kappa$, and that expected transaction losses of
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@ -413,6 +441,7 @@ a factor of $\kappa$ for tax evasion are thus unacceptable.
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Taler ensures that the state can tax {\em transactions}. We must,
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howerver, clarify what constitutes a transaction that can be taxed.
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% FIXME: Ethical??
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For ethical and practical reasons, we assume that coins can freely be
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copied between machines, and that coin deletion cannot be verified.
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Avoiding these assumptions would require extreme measures, like custom
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@ -931,6 +960,10 @@ than the comparable use of zk-SNARKs in ZeroCash~\cite{zerocash}.
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the location of the failure.
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\end{description}
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% FIXME: Maybe explain why we don't need n-m refreshing?
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% FIXME: What are the privacy implication of not having n-m refresh?
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% What about the resulting number of large coins, doesn't this reduce the anonymity set?
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%\subsection{N-to-M Refreshing}
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%
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%TODO: Explain, especially subtleties regarding session key / the spoofing attack that requires signature.
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