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@ -83,30 +83,30 @@ payments while maintaining unlinkability of transactions. We argue
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that Taler provides a secure digital currency for modern liberal
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that Taler provides a secure digital currency for modern liberal
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societies as it is a flexible, libre and efficient protocol and
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societies as it is a flexible, libre and efficient protocol and
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adequately balances the state's need for monetary control with the
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adequately balances the state's need for monetary control with the
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citizen's needs for private economic activity.
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citizen's needs for private economic activity.
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\end{abstract}
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\end{abstract}
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\section{Introduction}
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\section{Introduction}
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The design of payment systems shapes economies and societies.
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The design of payment systems shapes economies and societies.
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Strong, developed nation states are evolving towards transparent
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Strong, developed nation states are evolving towards transparent
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payment systems, such as the MasterCard and VisaCard credit card
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payment systems, such as the MasterCard and VisaCard credit card
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schemes and computerized bank transactions such as SWIFT.
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schemes and computerized bank transactions such as SWIFT.
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These systems enable mass surveillance by both governments and
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These systems enable mass surveillance by both governments and
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private companies, chilling customer activity~\cite{???}.
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private companies, chilling customer activity~\cite{???}.
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Aspects of this government control benifit the economy, by enabling
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Aspects of this government control benifit the economy, by enabling
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taxation. Also, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who
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taxation. Also, bribery and corruption are limited to elites who
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can afford to escape the dragnet.
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can afford to escape the dragnet.
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At the other extreme, weaker developing nation states have economic
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At the other extreme, weaker developing nation states have economic
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activity based largely on coins, paper money or even barter.
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activity based largely on coins, paper money or even barter.
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Here, the state is often unable to effectively monitor or tax economic
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Here, the state is often unable to effectively monitor or tax economic
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activity, and this limits the ability of the state to shape the society.
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activity, and this limits the ability of the state to shape the society.
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As bribery is virtually impossible to detect, corruption is widespread
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As bribery is virtually impossible to detect, corruption is widespread
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and not limited to social elites.
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and not limited to social elites.
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%
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%
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ZeroCoin~\cite{miers2013zerocoin} is an example for translating an
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ZeroCoin~\cite{miers2013zerocoin} is an example for translating an
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anarchistic economy into the digital realm.
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anarchistic economy into the digital realm.
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% FIXME: Unclear referee comment :
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% FIXME: Unclear referee comment :
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% I didn’t understand why ZeroCoin is particularly suited for
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% I didn’t understand why ZeroCoin is particularly suited for
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% developing nations?
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% developing nations?
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% => clarified: suited to model anarchistic economy.
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% => clarified: suited to model anarchistic economy.
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@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ customer, merchant and exchange (Figure~\ref{fig:cmm}).
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The two designs share the key first step where the {\em customer}
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The two designs share the key first step where the {\em customer}
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withdraws digital {\em coins} from the {\em exchange} with unlinkability
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withdraws digital {\em coins} from the {\em exchange} with unlinkability
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provided via blind signatures. The coins can then be spent at a
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provided via blind signatures. The coins can then be spent at a
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{\em merchant} who {\em deposits} them at the exchange.
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{\em merchant} who {\em deposits} them at the exchange.
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Taler uses online detection of double-spending, thus assuring the merchant
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Taler uses online detection of double-spending, thus assuring the merchant
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instantly that a transaction is valid.
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instantly that a transaction is valid.
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@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ be too inefficient, even for modern systems. The customer should not
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withdraw exact change from her account, as doing so reduces anonymity
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withdraw exact change from her account, as doing so reduces anonymity
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due to the obvious corrolation. A practical payment system must thus
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due to the obvious corrolation. A practical payment system must thus
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support giving change in the form of spendable coins, say a \EUR{0,01}
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support giving change in the form of spendable coins, say a \EUR{0,01}
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coin and a \EUR{50,00} coin.
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coin and a \EUR{50,00} coin.
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Taler solves the problem of giving change by introducing a new {\em
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Taler solves the problem of giving change by introducing a new {\em
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refresh} protocol. Using this protocol, a customer can obtain
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refresh} protocol. Using this protocol, a customer can obtain
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@ -233,9 +233,9 @@ include:
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should be free software (libre) to have a chance for widespread adoption.
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should be free software (libre) to have a chance for widespread adoption.
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\item Support for payments to off-line merchants, and thus deferred
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\item Support for payments to off-line merchants, and thus deferred
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detection of double-spending, requires the exchange to attempt to
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detection of double-spending, requires the exchange to attempt to
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recover funds from delinquent customers via the legal system.
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recover funds from delinquent customers via the legal system.
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Any system that fails to be self-enforcing creates a major
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Any system that fails to be self-enforcing creates a major
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business risk for the exchange and merchants.
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business risk for the exchange and merchants.
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In 1983, there were merchants without network connectivity, making that
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In 1983, there were merchants without network connectivity, making that
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feature relevant, but today network connectivity is feasible for most
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feature relevant, but today network connectivity is feasible for most
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merchants, and saves both the exchange and merchants the business risks
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merchants, and saves both the exchange and merchants the business risks
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@ -416,13 +416,13 @@ Ideally, the customer's anonymity is limited only by this channel;
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however, the payment system does additionally reveal that the customer
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however, the payment system does additionally reveal that the customer
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is one of the patrons of the exchange.
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is one of the patrons of the exchange.
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There are naturally risks that the customer-merchant business operation
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There are naturally risks that the customer-merchant business operation
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may leak identifying information about the customer.
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may leak identifying information about the customer.
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We consider information leakage specific to the business logic to be
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We consider information leakage specific to the business logic to be
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outside of the scope of the design of Taler.
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outside of the scope of the design of Taler.
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Aside from refreshing and obtaining denomination key, the customer
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Aside from refreshing and obtaining denomination key, the customer
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should ideally use an anonymous communication channel with the exchange
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should ideally use an anonymous communication channel with the exchange
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to obscure their IP address for location privacy, but naturally
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to obscure their IP address for location privacy, but naturally
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the exchange would typically learn the customer's identity from the wire
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the exchange would typically learn the customer's identity from the wire
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transfer that funds the customer's withdrawal of anonymous digital coins.
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transfer that funds the customer's withdrawal of anonymous digital coins.
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We believe this may even be desirable as there are laws, or bank policies,
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We believe this may even be desirable as there are laws, or bank policies,
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@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ Taler is thus only anonymous with respect to {\em payments}.
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In particular, the exchange
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In particular, the exchange
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is unable to link the known identity of the customer that withdrew
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is unable to link the known identity of the customer that withdrew
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anonymous digital coins to the {\em purchase} performed later at the
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anonymous digital coins to the {\em purchase} performed later at the
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merchant.
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merchant.
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While the customer thus has anonymity for purchases, the exchange will
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While the customer thus has anonymity for purchases, the exchange will
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always learn the merchant's identity in order to credit the merchant's
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always learn the merchant's identity in order to credit the merchant's
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@ -590,9 +590,9 @@ resumed at any step. Commitments to disk are cumulative, that is an
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additional commitment does not erase the previously committed
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additional commitment does not erase the previously committed
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information. Keys and thus coins always have a well-known expiration
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information. Keys and thus coins always have a well-known expiration
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date; information committed to disk can be discarded after the
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date; information committed to disk can be discarded after the
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expiration date of the respective public key.
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expiration date of the respective public key.
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Customers may discard information once the respective coins have been
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Customers may discard information once the respective coins have been
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fully spent, so long as refunds are not required.
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fully spent, so long as refunds are not required.
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Merchants may discard information once payments from the exchange have
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Merchants may discard information once payments from the exchange have
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been received, assuming the records are also no longer needed for tax
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been received, assuming the records are also no longer needed for tax
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purposes. The exchange's bank transfers dealing in traditional currency
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purposes. The exchange's bank transfers dealing in traditional currency
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@ -610,7 +610,7 @@ performs the following interaction with the exchange:
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% others, so probably withdrawal key should be renamed to reserve key.
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% others, so probably withdrawal key should be renamed to reserve key.
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% FIXME: These steps occur at very different points in time, so probably
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% FIXME: These steps occur at very different points in time, so probably
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% they should be restructured into more of a protocol discription.
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% they should be restructured into more of a protocol discription.
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% It does create some confusion, like is a withdrawal key semi-ephemeral
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% It does create some confusion, like is a withdrawal key semi-ephemeral
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% like a linking key?
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% like a linking key?
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@ -946,7 +946,7 @@ provides a payment system with the following key properties:
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Additionally, customers cannot defraud anyone, and
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Additionally, customers cannot defraud anyone, and
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merchants can only defraud their customers by not
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merchants can only defraud their customers by not
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delivering on the agreed contract. Neither merchants nor customers
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delivering on the agreed contract. Neither merchants nor customers
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are able to commit fraud against the exchange.
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are able to commit fraud against the exchange.
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Only the exchange needs be tightly audited and regulated.
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Only the exchange needs be tightly audited and regulated.
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\item[No speculation] % It's actually "Specualtion not required"
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\item[No speculation] % It's actually "Specualtion not required"
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The digital coins are denominated in existing currencies,
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The digital coins are denominated in existing currencies,
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@ -984,7 +984,7 @@ principle. However, as mentioned Taler does facilitate limits on
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withdrawals, which we believe is a better trade-off than the
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withdrawals, which we believe is a better trade-off than the
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problematic escrow systems where the necessary intransparency
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problematic escrow systems where the necessary intransparency
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actually facilitates voluntary cooperation between the exchange and
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actually facilitates voluntary cooperation between the exchange and
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criminals~\cite{sander1999escrow} and where the state could
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criminals~\cite{sander1999escrow} and where the state could
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deanonymize citizens.
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deanonymize citizens.
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\subsection{Offline Payments}
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\subsection{Offline Payments}
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