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add test for emergencies, and associated bugfixes to auditor and auditor report

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Christian Grothoff 2019-09-28 20:53:44 +02:00
parent e3564de010
commit 160a4ef52c
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3 changed files with 194 additions and 48 deletions
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47
contrib/auditor-report.tex.j2
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@ -224,15 +224,25 @@ exposure} is the amount of coins in circulation for a particular
denomination and the maximum loss for the exchange from this type of
compromise.
{% if (data.emergencies|length() != 0)
or (data.emergencies_by_count|length() != 0) %}
The total risk from emergencies is
{\bf {{ data.emergencies_risk_total }} }
{% if (data.emergencies|length() != 0) %}
The total risk from emergencies detected by amount is
{\bf {{ data.emergencies_risk_by_amount }} }.
The total loss from emergencies detected by amount is
{\bf {{ data.emergencies_loss }} }.
{% endif %}
{% if (data.emergencies_by_count|length() != 0) %}
The total risk from emergencies detected by counting coins is
{\bf {{ data.emergencies_risk_by_count }} }
The total loss from emergencies detected by counting coins could be up to
{\bf {{ data.emergencies_loss_by_count }} }.
{% endif %}
\subsubsection{Emergencies by counting coins}
% Table generation tested by testcase #18 in test-auditor.sh
{% if data.emergencies_by_count|length() == 0 %}
{\bf No emergencies detected by counting coins.}
{% else %}
@ -251,7 +261,7 @@ The total risk from emergencies is
\label{table:emergencies_coin_counting}
\endlastfoot
{% for item in data.emergencies_by_count %}
\multicolumn{4}{l}{ {\tt \truncate{\textwidth}{ {{ item.denompub_hash }} } } } \\
\multicolumn{4}{l}{ {\tt \truncate{0.95\textwidth}{ {{ item.denompub_hash }} } } } \\
\nopagebreak
{{ item.value }} &
{\tiny \begin{tabular}{c}
@ -264,8 +274,11 @@ The total risk from emergencies is
\end{longtable}
{% endif %}
\subsubsection{Emergencies by value deposited}
% Table generation tested by testcase #18 in test-auditor.sh
{% if data.emergencies|length() == 0 %}
{\bf No emergencies by value detected.}
{% else %}
@ -284,7 +297,7 @@ The total risk from emergencies is
\label{table:emergencies}
\endlastfoot
{% for item in data.emergencies %}
\multicolumn{4}{l}{ {\tt \truncate{\textwidth}{ {{ item.denompub_hash }} } } } \\
\multicolumn{4}{l}{ {\tt \truncate{0.95\textwidth}{ {{ item.denompub_hash }} } } } \\
\nopagebreak
{{ item.value }} &
{\tiny \begin{tabular}{c}
@ -306,32 +319,40 @@ Disagreements imply that either the exchange made a loss (sending out
too much money), or screwed a customer (and thus at least needs to fix
the financial damage done to the customer).
% Table generation tested by testcase #18 in test-auditor.sh
{% if data.amount_arithmetic_inconsistencies|length() == 0 %}
{\bf No arithmetic problems detected.}
{% else %}
\begin{longtable}{p{3.5cm}|l|r|r}
{\bf Operation} & {\bf Table row} & \multicolumn{2}{|c|}{ {\bf Exchange}} & \multicolumn{2}{|c}{ {\bf Auditor}} \\
\begin{longtable}{p{3.5cm}|r|r|r|c}
{\bf Operation} & {\bf Row} & {\bf Exchange} & {\bf Auditor} & {\bf P} \\
\hline \hline
\endfirsthead
{\bf Operation} & {\bf Table row} & \multicolumn{2}{|c|}{ {\bf Exchange}} & \multicolumn{2}{|c}{ {\bf Auditor}} \\ \hline \hline
{\bf Operation} & {\bf Row} & {\bf Exchange} & {\bf Auditor} & {\bf P} \\ \hline \hline
\endhead
\hline \hline
{\bf Operation} & {\bf Table row} & \multicolumn{2}{|c|}{ {\bf Exchange}} & \multicolumn{2}{|c}{ {\bf Auditor}} \\
{\bf Operation} & {\bf Row} & {\bf Exchange} & {\bf Auditor} & {\bf P} \\
\endfoot
\hline \hline
\multicolumn{2}{l|}{ {\bf $\sum$ Deltas (Auditor-Exchange)} } &
+ {{ data.total_arithmetic_delta_plus }} &
- {{ data.total_arithmetic_delta_minus }} \\
- {{ data.total_arithmetic_delta_minus }} & \\
\caption{Arithmetic inconsistencies.}
\label{table:amount:arithmetic:inconsistencies}
\endlastfoot
{% for item in data.amount_arithmetic_inconsistencies %}
{{ item.operation }} &
\truncate{3.3cm}{ {\tiny {{ item.operation }} } } &
{{ item.rowid }} &
{{ item.exchange }} &
{{ item.auditor }} \\ \hline
{{ item.auditor }} &
{{ item.profitable }} \\ \hline
{% endfor %}
\end{longtable}
The {\bf P} colum is set to "1" if the arithmetic problem was be determined to be
profitable for the exchange, "-1" if the problem resulted in a net loss for
the exchange, and "0" if this is unclear or at least the gain/loss is not
easily determined from the amounts and thus not included in the totals.
{% endif %}

127
src/auditor/taler-auditor.c
View File

@ -268,10 +268,25 @@ static json_int_t number_missed_deposit_confirmations;
*/
static struct TALER_Amount total_missed_deposit_confirmations;
/**
* Total amount reported in all calls to #report_emergency_by_count().
*/
static struct TALER_Amount reported_emergency_risk_by_count;
/**
* Total amount reported in all calls to #report_emergency().
*/
static struct TALER_Amount reported_emergency_sum;
static struct TALER_Amount reported_emergency_risk_by_amount;
/**
* Total amount in losses reported in all calls to #report_emergency().
*/
static struct TALER_Amount reported_emergency_loss;
/**
* Total amount in losses reported in all calls to #report_emergency_by_count().
*/
static struct TALER_Amount reported_emergency_loss_by_count;
/**
* Expected balance in the escrow account.
@ -419,9 +434,13 @@ report_emergency_by_amount (const struct
"value",
TALER_JSON_from_amount_nbo (&dki->properties.value)));
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_add (&reported_emergency_sum,
&reported_emergency_sum,
TALER_amount_add (&reported_emergency_risk_by_amount,
&reported_emergency_risk_by_amount,
risk));
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_add (&reported_emergency_loss,
&reported_emergency_loss,
loss));
}
@ -446,6 +465,8 @@ report_emergency_by_count (const struct
uint64_t num_known,
const struct TALER_Amount *risk)
{
struct TALER_Amount denom_value;
report (report_emergencies_by_count,
json_pack ("{s:o, s:I, s:I, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o}",
"denompub_hash",
@ -463,9 +484,17 @@ report_emergency_by_count (const struct
"value",
TALER_JSON_from_amount_nbo (&dki->properties.value)));
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_add (&reported_emergency_sum,
&reported_emergency_sum,
TALER_amount_add (&reported_emergency_risk_by_count,
&reported_emergency_risk_by_count,
risk));
TALER_amount_ntoh (&denom_value,
&dki->properties.value);
for (uint64_t i = num_issued; i<num_known; i++)
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_add (&reported_emergency_loss_by_count,
&reported_emergency_loss_by_count,
&denom_value));
}
@ -1650,7 +1679,7 @@ verify_reserve_balance (void *cls,
ret = GNUNET_SYSERR;
rc->qs = qs;
}
cleanup:
cleanup:
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_YES ==
GNUNET_CONTAINER_multihashmap_remove (rc->reserves,
key,
@ -3859,16 +3888,28 @@ refresh_session_cb (void *cls,
{
dso->denom_balance = tmp;
}
if (GNUNET_SYSERR ==
TALER_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
if (-1 == TALER_amount_cmp (&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee))
{
/* This should not be possible, unless the AUDITOR
has a bug in tracking total balance. */
GNUNET_break (0);
cc->qs = GNUNET_DB_STATUS_HARD_ERROR;
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
/* This can theoretically happen if for example the exchange
never issued any coins (i.e. escrow balance is zero), but
accepted a forged coin (i.e. emergency situation after
private key compromise). In that case, we cannot even
subtract the profit we make from the fee from the escrow
balance. Tested as part of test-auditor.sh, case #18 */
report_amount_arithmetic_inconsistency (
"subtracting refresh fee from escrow balance",
rowid,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee,
0);
}
else
{
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_SYSERR !=
TALER_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee));
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
@ -4030,16 +4071,29 @@ deposit_cb (void *cls,
{
ds->denom_balance = tmp;
}
if (GNUNET_SYSERR ==
TALER_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
if (-1 == TALER_amount_cmp (&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee))
{
/* This should not be possible, unless the AUDITOR
has a bug in tracking total balance. */
GNUNET_break (0);
cc->qs = GNUNET_DB_STATUS_HARD_ERROR;
return GNUNET_SYSERR;
/* This can theoretically happen if for example the exchange
never issued any coins (i.e. escrow balance is zero), but
accepted a forged coin (i.e. emergency situation after
private key compromise). In that case, we cannot even
subtract the profit we make from the fee from the escrow
balance. Tested as part of test-auditor.sh, case #18 */
report_amount_arithmetic_inconsistency (
"subtracting deposit fee from escrow balance",
rowid,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee,
0);
}
else
{
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_SYSERR !=
TALER_amount_subtract (&total_escrow_balance,
&total_escrow_balance,
amount_with_fee));
}
GNUNET_log (GNUNET_ERROR_TYPE_DEBUG,
@ -5094,7 +5148,16 @@ run (void *cls,
"Starting audit\n");
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_get_zero (currency,
&reported_emergency_sum));
&reported_emergency_loss));
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_get_zero (currency,
&reported_emergency_risk_by_amount));
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_get_zero (currency,
&reported_emergency_risk_by_count));
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_get_zero (currency,
&reported_emergency_loss_by_count));
GNUNET_assert (GNUNET_OK ==
TALER_amount_get_zero (currency,
&total_escrow_balance));
@ -5213,7 +5276,8 @@ run (void *cls,
" s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o,"
" s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o,"
" s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:I,"
" s:o, s:o, s:o }",
" s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o, s:o,"
" s:o }",
/* blocks of 5 for easier counting/matching to format string */
/* block */
"reserve_balance_insufficient_inconsistencies",
@ -5248,8 +5312,9 @@ run (void *cls,
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&income_fee_total),
"emergencies",
report_emergencies,
"emergencies_risk_total",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&reported_emergency_sum),
"emergencies_risk_by_amount",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (
&reported_emergency_risk_by_amount),
"reserve_not_closed_inconsistencies",
report_reserve_not_closed_inconsistencies,
/* block */
@ -5309,7 +5374,15 @@ run (void *cls,
"total_payback_loss",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&total_payback_loss),
"emergencies_by_count",
report_emergencies_by_count
report_emergencies_by_count,
"emergencies_risk_by_count",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (
&reported_emergency_risk_by_count),
"emergencies_loss",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&reported_emergency_loss),
/* block */
"emergencies_loss_by_count",
TALER_JSON_from_amount (&reported_emergency_loss_by_count)
);
GNUNET_break (NULL != report);
json_dumpf (report,

54
src/auditor/test-auditor.sh
View File

@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ function audit_only () {
# Cleanup to run after the auditor
function post_audit () {
kill -9 `jobs -p` >/dev/null 2>/dev/null || true
kill -TERM `jobs -p` >/dev/null 2>/dev/null || true
echo -n "TeXing ."
../../contrib/render.py test-audit.json test-wire-audit.json < ../../contrib/auditor-report.tex.j2 > test-report.tex || exit_fail "Renderer failed"
@ -980,6 +980,58 @@ echo "UPDATE app_banktransaction SET date='${OLD_DATE}' WHERE id='${OLD_ID}';" |
# Test where we trigger an emergency.
function test_18() {
echo "===========18: emergency================="
echo "DELETE FROM reserves_out;" | psql -Aqt $DB
run_audit
echo -n "Testing emergency detection... "
jq -e .reserve_balance_summary_wrong_inconsistencies[0] < test-audit.json > /dev/null || exit_fail "Reserve balance inconsistency not detected"
jq -e .emergencies[0] < test-audit.json > /dev/null || exit_fail "Emergency not detected"
jq -e .emergencies_by_count[0] < test-audit.json > /dev/null || exit_fail "Emergency by count not detected"
jq -e .amount_arithmetic_inconsistencies[0] < test-audit.json > /dev/null || exit_fail "Escrow balance calculation impossibility not detected"
echo PASS
echo -n "Testing risk/loss calculation... "
AMOUNT=`jq -r .emergencies_risk_by_amount < test-audit.json`
if test "x$AMOUNT" == "xTESTKUDOS:0"
then
exit_fail "Reported amount wrong: $AMOUNT"
fi
AMOUNT=`jq -r .emergencies_risk_by_count < test-audit.json`
if test "x$AMOUNT" == "xTESTKUDOS:0"
then
exit_fail "Reported amount wrong: $AMOUNT"
fi
AMOUNT=`jq -r .emergencies_loss < test-audit.json`
if test "x$AMOUNT" == "xTESTKUDOS:0"
then
exit_fail "Reported amount wrong: $AMOUNT"
fi
AMOUNT=`jq -r .emergencies_loss_by_count < test-audit.json`
if test "x$AMOUNT" == "xTESTKUDOS:0"
then
exit_fail "Reported amount wrong: $AMOUNT"
fi
echo PASS
# cannot easily undo broad DELETE operation, hence full reload
echo -n "Reloading database ..."
full_reload
echo "DONE"
}
# **************************************************
# FIXME: Add more tests here! :-)
# Specifically: