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blow up k on M+1st price auctions

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This commit is contained in:
Markus Teich 2016-10-13 23:39:17 +02:00
parent a4c883147d
commit 79d4275619
1 changed files with 20 additions and 3 deletions
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23
brandt.c
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@ -55,17 +55,26 @@ BRANDT_bidder_start (struct BRANDT_Auction *auction,
uint16_t i, uint16_t i,
uint16_t n) uint16_t n)
{ {
GNUNET_assert (auction && n > 0 && i < n);
auction->n = n;
auction->i = i;
enum auction_type atype; enum auction_type atype;
enum outcome_type outcome; enum outcome_type outcome;
unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *buf;
size_t buflen; size_t buflen;
GNUNET_assert (auction && n > 0 && i < n);
auction->n = n;
auction->i = i;
atype = auction->m > 0 ? auction_mPlusFirstPrice : auction_firstPrice; atype = auction->m > 0 ? auction_mPlusFirstPrice : auction_firstPrice;
outcome = auction->outcome_public ? outcome_public : outcome_private; outcome = auction->outcome_public ? outcome_public : outcome_private;
/* On M+1st price auctions we multiply the amount of prizes by the amount of
* bidders and resctrict each bidder to his own distinct subset of the
* prices. This is done for tie breaking. An additional proof is used in the
* encrypt_bid round to show that the bidder has chosen a valid bid and the
* outcome callback will remap the result to the original k price values. */
if (auction_mPlusFirstPrice == atype)
auction->k *= n;
if (handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init]) if (handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init])
handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init] (auction); handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init] (auction);
@ -102,6 +111,14 @@ seller_start (void *arg)
atype = ad->m > 0 ? auction_mPlusFirstPrice : auction_firstPrice; atype = ad->m > 0 ? auction_mPlusFirstPrice : auction_firstPrice;
outcome = ad->outcome_public ? outcome_public : outcome_private; outcome = ad->outcome_public ? outcome_public : outcome_private;
/* On M+1st price auctions we multiply the amount of prizes by the amount of
* bidders and resctrict each bidder to his own distinct subset of the
* prices. This is done for tie breaking. An additional proof is used in the
* encrypt_bid round to show that the bidder has chosen a valid bid and the
* outcome callback will remap the result to the original k price values. */
if (auction_mPlusFirstPrice == atype)
ad->k *= ad->n;
if (handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init]) if (handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init])
handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init] (ad); handler_prep[atype][outcome][msg_init] (ad);
} }